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Washington, DC  20555-0001 
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Gentlemen: 
DOCKET NUMBER  50-483 
CALLAWAY  PLANT 
UNION  ELECTRIC COMPANY 
OPERATING LICENSE AMEMDMENT REQUEST: 
"UNREVIEWED  SAFETY QUESTION REGARDING 
INSTALLATION  OF LOAD TAP CHANGING TRANSFORMERS TO 
PROVIDE OFFSITE POWER TO THE SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL 
BUSES" 
(References:  1. ULNRC-04220,  dated April  17,  1999 
2. ULNRC-04239,  (FSAR Update) dated May  1, 2000 
Pursuant to  10 CFR 50.90, AmerenUE  hereby requests an amendment to the 
Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 for Callaway Plant.  Upon approval of this 
request the proposed changes will be incorporated  into the Callaway Plant (Updated) 
Final Safety Analysis Report.  
The proposed changes support the planned replacement of the Engineered  Safety 
Features (ESF) Transformers with new transformers  having active automatic Load Tap 
Changers (LTCs).  This design change was evaluated  per  10 CFR 50.59 and was 
determined to constitute  an Unreviewed  Safety Question as defined in  10 CFR 50.59 
(a)(2)(i) and (ii).  Specifically, a failure of the LTC controller, providing  an active 
function to provide acceptable voltages to the safety-related  electrical distribution 
system, could:  increase the probability  of malfunction of equipment important to safety 
previously evaluated  in the FSAR, and could  create the possibility of a malfunction  of 
equipment  important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the 
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FSAR.  (50.59 criteria (a)(2)(i) and (ii) respectively.)  However, a new accident is not 
being created and no radiological consequences  are being affected.  
AmerenUE has already installed capacitor banks associated with the ESF busses 
to compensate for low grid voltage.  The capacitor banks were evaluated and installed 
under  10 CFR 50.59 and did not involve an unreviewed safety question. The new 
transformers  with LTCs will work in conjunction with the installed capacitor banks.  
Attachment  1 is the required Affidavit.  Attachment 2 provides a detailed 
description of the proposed change and AmerenUE's determination that the proposed 
change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.  Attachment 3 provides the 
existing FSAR pages marked-up to show the proposed change.  Attachment 3 includes 
changes to the Callaway FSAR approved by AmerenUE since the required  10 CFR 
50.71 (e) update submitted in Reference 2, these pages are designated "OL- 12  11/01".  
FSAR changes regarding the capacitor banks are not considered part of the 
aforementioned Unreviewed Safety Question.  Attachment 4 provides the existing TS 
Bases pages marked-up to show the proposed change.  
This letter identifies the actions committed to by AmerenUE in this submittal.  
Other statements are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be 
commitments.  Commitments included in this submittal are as follows: 
a.  AmerenUE will begin to implement major portions of this modification 
during Refuel  11,  starting on April 7, 2001.  
b.  Installation of the load tap changing transformer with the taps fixed is 
considered a like kind replacement  which AmerenUE  has evaluated and 
approved per  10 CFR 50.59.  
c.  Administrative controls and/or physical blocks will be implemented to 
ensure the load tap changers  are fixed and not operational until approval of 
this amendment.  
d.  Post-modification testing of the LTCs will be performed during Refuel  11 to 
support automatic  operation of the LTC after amendment approval.  If this 
amendment is not approved prior to the completion of Refuel  11,  no further 
testing will be required.  Post modification testing procedures will be 
developed and evaluated in accordance  with 10 CFR 50.59.  
AmerenUE requests approval of this proposed License Amendment prior to the 
beginning of the next refueling outage scheduled for April 7, 2001.  Receipt of this 
Amendment is not required to conduct the outage or to restart the unit following the 
outage (with tap changers fixed).  However, approval of the requested change prior to 
the outage will allow the load tap changers to operate and enhance availability of offsite 
power to the Callaway Plant.  
Pursuant to  10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), AmerenUE  is providing the State of Missouri 
with a copy of this proposed amendment.ULNRC-04353 
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If you should have any questions on the above or attached, please contact Dave 
Shafer at (314) 554-3104 or Walter Muskopf at (573) 676-4327.  
Very truly yours, 
I  Alan C. Passwater 
Manager, Corporate Nuclear Services
ACP/WPM/mib 
Attachments:  1) 
2) 
3) 
4)
Affidavit 
Description of Proposed Changes  and Assessment 
Existing Marked-up FSAR 
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cc:  U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  (Original and  1 copy) 
Attn:  Document Control Desk 
Mail Stop P1-137 
Washington, DC  20555-0001 
Mr. Ellis W. Merschoff 
Regional Administrator 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Region IV 
611  Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 
Arlington, TX  76011-8064 
Senior Resident Inspector 
Callaway Resident Office 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  Commission 
8201 NRC Road 
Steedman, MO  65077 
Mr. Jack N. Donohew (2 copies) 
Licensing  Project Manager, Callaway Plant 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Mail Stop 7El 
Washington, DC  20555-2738 
Manager, Electric Department 
Missouri Public Service Commission 
PO Box 360 
Jefferson City, MO  65102 
Deputy Director 
Department of Natural Resources 
PO Box 176 
Jefferson City, MO  65102 
Mr. Thomas A. Baxter 
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 
2300 N. Street N.W.  
Washington, DC  20037Attachment  1 to 
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STATE-OF MISSOURI  ) 
")  SS 
COUNTY OF CALLAWAY) 
David Shafer, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is 
Supervising Engineer,  Corporate Nuclear Services, Regulatory Operations for Union 
Electric  Company; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content 
thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said company with full power 
and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief.  
By 
David Shafer 
Supervising Engineer, 
Regulatory Operations, 
Corporate Nuclear Services 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this  /d  day 
of  ,2001.  
•OT1AfY  •1BU•C 
SATE OF  SSOURI -CALLAWkY  COUNTY 
NOTARY SEAL 
Y  COUMISRON EXPIR..  JUICE 21,2003Attachment 2 to 
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Description of Proposed Changes and Assessment 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This modification will replace the existing Engineered Safety Features Transformers with 
transformers having automatic  load tap changers.  This constitutes an Unreviewed Safety 
question per  1OCFR50.59 (a)(2)(i) and (ii) 
2.0  DESCRIPTION: 
Approval of the proposed amendment would result in the update of the Callaway FSAR 
to reflect this new feature and associated evaluation.  References to the Callaway FSAR 
are to the FSAR as updated including changes  submitted per 10 CFR 50.71(e) in 
Reference 2 and licensee approved changes hence.  
3.0  BACKGROUND 
This background information was summarized from LER 99-005 Revision 2, refer 
to Reference  1.  
On August  12,  1999, with the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), the switchyard voltage 
supplied from the grid was observed to decrease below the minimum operability limit 
established in station procedures.  The Technical Specification action statement for 
inoperability of both offsite sources was entered,  and the Control Area Operator within 
the Energy Supply Operations Department was contacted to initiate actions to increase 
switchyard voltage.  The Control Area Operator's actions, combined with a decreasing 
system demand, subsequently restored switchyard voltages above the minimum 
operability limitation, and the Technical Specification action statement was exited.  Both 
offsite power sources were inoperable for approximately  12 hours.  
(Note:  "Grid," refers to the North American Eastern Interconnection of which 
Ameren's Control Area is a part.) 
Due to high ambient temperatures,  service territory loading was near peak levels.  Even at 
these peak levels, it was predicted that switchyard voltage would remain above the 
established operability limits based on previous load flow analyses.  During 
investigations to establish the cause for this unanticipated  switchyard voltage, engineering 
reviews determined that large amounts of power were being transported across the grid on 
the day of this occurrence.  This power was being transported from northern utilities to 
the southern portion of the United States due to a shortfall in generation in that area and a 
significant weather diversity.  The magnitude of the power being transported across the 
grid had not been previously observed and was far in excess of typical levels.  The 
deregulated wholesale power market contributes to conditions where higher grid power 
flows are likely to occur.  These large flows were observed at this time.  Since load flowAttachment 2 to 
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analyses had not analyzed this level of system loading, the minimum voltage previously 
established was not valid for verifying that the offsite source would have adequate 
capability to supply station loads during a design basis accident.  
During plant operations, switchyard voltage indications were not adequate  for 
determining operability of the offsite source in the event the plant should trip 
offline.  Similar grid loading conditions were present on August  10,  1999, the day 
before the plant tripped.  Low switchyard voltages were not observed at that time 
since Callaway generation was locally supporting grid voltage.  Therefore,  the 
capability (with the plant operating) of the offsite source could not be readily 
verified when the unit was in operation.  Offsite source capability is normally 
confirmed by an analysis that considers the anticipated loading conditions on the 
grid.  With grid loading above these previously analyzed values, the plant was 
placed in a condition which was outside of its design basis analysis for verifying 
the offsite source would have adequate capacity to supply station loads during a 
design basis accident.  
The direct cause of the low switchyard voltage was a high service territory demand 
combined with large amounts of power being transported across the grid.  The root cause 
attributed to this event was not anticipating the simultaneous occurrence  of the 
aforementioned conditions.  Widespread high temperatures in the South and lower 
Midwest, unavailability of generation in the South, and cool temperatures in the North 
combined together to create conditions for large grid power flows to occur.  The 
deregulated power market used these conditions to transport large amounts of power from 
the north to the south.  These high power flows and high native system loads exceeded 
the anticipated conditions modeled in the load flow analyses.  
Another factor associated with this event was attributed to inadequate administrative 
controls for ensuring that the design analysis encompassed a sufficient range of grid 
operating conditions.  
The corrective actions taken are as follows: 
1)  Conditions within the grid load flow analysis were revised and the analysis was 
re-performed.  Restrictions on plant electrical  lineups were subsequently 
implemented to support switchyard operability.  These actions were 
implemented to support offsite source operability pending completion of plant 
modifications that will permit the onsite power distribution system to 
accommodate a wider range of offsite source voltages.  
2)  A program has been established to periodically review the grid load flow 
analysis prior to each peak loading season to ensure that anticipated changes in 
transmission system operation are incorporated  into the analysis.  SignificantAttachment 2 to 
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changes in transmission  system operating conditions  or configuration which 
occur between review periods are also required to be evaluated to determine 
potential impacts on the grid load flow analysis.  
3)  Energy Supply Operations has implemented use of an online computer model 
for determining the adequacy of the grid to support Callaway offsite source 
operability requirements.  The model continuously incorporates real-time 
measured grid powerflows  and voltages, and predicts system conditions for a 
wide variety of grid contingencies.  This model allows for near real time 
monitoring of the grid to ensure operability requirements of the offsite sources 
would be satisfied given a loss of Callaway generation.  
4)  Administrative controls have been established between plant staff departments 
and Energy Supply Operations in order to formalize the process in which the 
online computer model is utilized when monitoring offsite source operability.  
These administrative controls also outline the plant's design basis requirements 
for offsite source voltage and the specific responsibilities  of these departments 
in maintaining offsite source voltage within these limitations.  
5)  Training has been provided to plant staff Operations personnel to enhance 
operator awareness of off-site source reliability and degraded voltage concerns.  
6)  Plant modifications include installation of capacitor banks and load tap 
changing transformers (This License Amendment Request) to improve voltage 
regulation on each of the plant's safety related 4.16 kV buses.  These 
modifications will allow the plant's design basis to be supported by a wider 
range of offsite source voltages.  
A historical review was performed to identify previous timeframes in which system 
loading conditions may have caused switchyard voltage to decrease below the minimum 
operability limit had the plant been offline.  The timeframe chosen for this evaluation was 
from September  1997 to present, with a previous plant trip in August of 1995 also 
included within this evaluation.  In addition to the  12 hours of inoperability observed on 
August 12,  1999 and the  1 hour observed on August  11,  1999, this review yielded an 
additional 23 hours for which these conditions may have been present.  Eleven of these 
hours were observed across two days in July 1998, with the remaining hours observed 
across 6 days from late July to mid-August 1999.  Both trains of emergency AC power 
(and their associated support systems) were operable for performing their intended safety 
function during these timeframes.  The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was also 
operable during the above timeframes.Attachment 2 to 
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4.0  TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1.1  Design Description - General: 
This modification  is affecting the preferred power sources (i.e., the offsite source circuits) 
to the Class 1E electrical distribution systems.  Due to changes in the electrical grid, a 
wider range of grid voltages is expected in the future.  This modification will equip the 
preferred power sources with the ability to provide acceptable voltages to the safety 
related electrical distribution system given this wider range of voltages.  The replacement 
of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) transformers  XNB01 and XNB02 with new 
transformers having automatic  load tap changers (LTCs) on their secondary windings 
function along with the capacitor banks, to control the voltage from the preferred off site 
power sources.  Table  1 lists the design parameters of the new ESF transformers with 
automatic  LTCs.  The capacitor banks were installed under licensee approval per 10 CFR 
50.59.  
Per  10CFR50 Appendix A GDC  17 criteria, a design shall be provided to minimize to the 
extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and 
postulated accident and environmental conditions.  As such, physical and electrical 
separation is provided.  The LTC transformers do not share any common electrical or 
control circuits and cannot be paralleled even if the Class 1  E 4.16kV Busses NBO 1 and 
NB02 are cross connected.  Therefore, the probability that simultaneous failures of both 
transformers to cause both offsite sources to become inoperable is negligible.  Addition of 
automatic load tap changing ESF transformers will support availability of the preferred 
offsite circuits and thus reduce the probability of unnecessarily shedding the offsite 
source and sequencing onto the onsite standby emergency diesel generators.  
FSAR Figure  1.2-1  shows the location of the ESF transformers,  FSAR Figure 8.3-1  Sheet 
1 is a one-line diagram of the electrical distribution system, and FSAR Figure 8.3-3 
shows the voltage control system interface with the Emergency Diesel Generator.  These 
Figures are part of the proposed update per  1OCFR50.71 (e)  and are included in 
Attachment 3.  These updated Figures and the text portions of Attachment 3 reflect this 
license amendment request in the FSAR.  The FSAR will be updated in accordance with 
10 CFR 50.71(e) based on amendment approval.Attachment 2 to 
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Table  1 
ESF Transformer Design Specifications
Phases per transformer 
Frequency 
Output at 650 C 
Cooling Method 
Winding temperature rise by resistance 
Impedance at 12 MVA base 
High Voltage  Winding 
Low Voltage Winding 
Transformer connection High Voltage 
Transformer connection Low Voltage 
High Voltage Phase relation 
Low Voltage Phase relation 
High Voltage Winding / Bushing BIL 
Low Voltage Winding / Bushing BIL 
Neutral End Winding / Bushing BIL 
High Voltage Insulation Class, kV 
Low Voltage Insulation Class, kV 
Neutral Insulation Class, kV 
High Voltage Taps / Range 
Low Voltage Taps / Range
3 
60 Hz 
12/16 MVA 
OA/FA (Oil Air/Forced Air) 
65 0 C 
5.35% 
13.8 kV 
4.16 kV 
Delta 
Grounded wye through 
resistor 
Standard HV leads 
Lag HV by 30' 
110 kV (Basic Insulation 
Level) 
75 kV 
75 kV 
15 kV 
5 kV 
5 kV 
4 no-load / + 5% (2.5%  steps) 
Auto on-load / + 16%  (1% 
steps)
4.1.2  Station Blackout 10 CFR 50.63: 
The new replacement transformers for XNB01 and XNB02 are non-safety related and 
will be connected to non-safety related capacitor banks NB03 and NB04 using manual 
full load break switches.  The ESF transformers provide the ability to restore the preferred 
offsite power sources (i.e.,  SBO recovery).  AmerenUE evaluations performed to 
establish compliance with 1OCFR50.63  determined that only transformer XNB02 is 
required to be included in the SBO program.  Replacement transformer XNBO 1 is 
associated with train "A", and therefore does not support nor is it required to be classified 
as Station Blackout Equipment (SBO).  Replacement transformer XNB02 is associated 
with train "B",  which is the defined SBO train.  The new transformer and associated 
control equipment will retain an SBO classification.  The additional small load placed on 
station blackout battery PK12 by XNB02 and NB04 will not adversely impact the 
battery's ability to fulfill its station blackout function.Attachment 2 to 
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4.1.3  Fire Protection Design License Condition - C(5)(d) 
The new transformer's size and oil volume affects the physical separation design.  The 
transformer oil volume is increasing  approximately 2600 gallons and the physical outline 
is increasing.  The existing XNBO 1 and XNB02 transformer pit design is divided into two 
main compartments  and two sumps.  As stated in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.2.5,  the pit is 
sized to contain oil from the largest transformer served by the pit and the water from two 
transformer fire protection systems operating for 10 minutes.  The larger oil volume 
affects the margin in the pit sizing.  FSAR Table 9.5.1-1  documents that the fire 
protection water flow rate is designed to be 0.25 gallons per minute per square foot of 
surface area protected.  The larger transformer outline requires a revision to the fire 
protection deluge system.  The transformer pit is designed such that the oil will be 
contained by the pit even with the additional water from two transformer water spray 
systems operating for ten minutes in accordance with requirements and is therefore 
acceptable.  This fire protection design meets the Facility Operating License  Condition 
C(5)(d) allowing the licensee to approve the change.  
4.1.4  Off-Site Interface: 
The existing minimum offsite voltage for the preferred off site power sources required in 
the Callaway switchyard after a Callaway plant trip is established by AmerenUE load 
flow analysis (References 7.10, 7.11).  
This current minimum voltage is: 
1.  Capacitor banks OPERABLE 
Both ESF transformers in service  338.1  kV 
One ESF transformer in service  346.0 kV 
2.  No capacitor banks OPERABLE 
Both ESF transformers in service  348.5 kV 
One ESF transformer in service  354.2 kV 
These voltage requirements are kept below the expected grid voltages in order to ensure 
adequate voltages  from the off site power sources.  Ameren  Services Transmission 
Planning bi-annually calculates by load flow analysis the expected grid voltage range for 
peak conditions for Callaway's switchyard in accordance with 1OCFR50 Appendix A 
GDC 17 criteria.  In addition, the control area operator, AmerenUE Energy Supply 
Operations (ESO), monitors and models the available system grid voltage, including 
Callaway's switchyard voltage.  Real time transmission system data is collected using a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and then analyzed using a 
contingency computer.  The ESO contingency computer uses the real-time SCADAAttachment 2 to 
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system data and defined system failures to predict the final grid system load flows and 
voltages assuming predicted failures were to occur.  
The ESO contingency  model includes several defined failures that will help predict the 
minimum Callaway switchyard voltage after a Callaway plant trip.  ESO has assigned a 
special watch guard alarm with a specific  acceptance limit set high enough to help assure 
that the required minimum switchyard voltage would be available  at Callaway following 
a trip if the predicted grid failures were present.  
The replacement Engineered Safety Features transformers XNB01  and XNB02 will 
include automatic load tap changers on their secondary windings.  The new transformers 
when combined with the previously installed six MVAr sized capacitor banks, NB03  and 
NB04, will help assure that the required minimum safe operating voltage is available at 
the Class lE busses under a wider range of grid voltage.  This equipment is adding 
voltage regulation capability to the off-site power sources.  The new transformers meet 
the electrical design requirements of the original transformers.  
The automatic  load tap changers  are capable of varying the voltage at the respective NB 
bus by ±16% (1% per step with 32 steps), the equivalent of approximately ± 665 Volts at 
the 4160 Volt level.  The load tap changer range will be limited by a gear driven limit 
switch to a 6%  buck and a 4% boost to limit the voltage extremes created by the 
transformers.  Reference  7.10 documents the new Callaway switchyard voltage 
minimums required with the new transformers,  combined with the existing capacitor 
banks installed.  The results are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Switchyard Voltage Minimums 
1.  Automatic LTCs and capacitor banks OPERABLE 
Both ESF transformers in service  329.8 kV 
One ESF transformer in service  332.9 kV 
2.  Automatic LTCs with taps fixed and capacitor banks OPERABLE 
Both ESF transformers in service  335.7 kV 
One ESF transformer in service  344 kV 
3.  Automatic LTCs OPERABLE and capacitor banks out of service 
Both ESF transformers in service  341.2 kV 
One ESF transformer in service  344.3 kV 
4.  Automatic LTCs with taps fixed and capacitor banks out of service 
Both ESF transformers in service  347.1  kVAttachment 2 to 
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Note: Line up 4 operation is only used in a dual source lineup- one ESF transformer 
feeding one NB bus for an OPERABLE line up.  A single source line up with one ESF 
transformer feeding two NB busses is allowed, but not considered OPERABLE under this 
line-up.  
4.2  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis: 
Each transformer  is independent and can not be interconnected  with the other transformer 
in any way.  The failure of one transformer will have no effect on the operability of the 
other transformer or Class  1  E equipment train.  The credible failure mechanisms of the 
transformers that will have the worst-case effects on the associated Class 1  E equipment 
can be categorized into the following distinct cases: 
Case 1 The transformer tap changer control fails low and raises the NB bus voltage 
unexpectedly.  
Case 2 The transformer tap changer control fails high and lowers the NB bus voltage 
unexpectedly.  
Case 3 The tap changer fails to move.  
Case 4 The transformer fails or faults which causes the upstream and downstream 
feeder breakers to the associated 13.8 kV to 4.16 kV transformer to trip.  
These cases have  been reflected  in the update of FSAR Table 8.3-4, "Failure Modes  and 
Effects Analysis," for the Callaway electrical system.  
The failure modes and their effect follow: 
Case 1  Failure mechanisms that cause the transformer tap changer to fail and 
raise the NB bus voltage unexpectedly.  
"*  Tap changer control circuit failure mechanisms.  
*  The tap changer primary and back-up voltage controllers  fail low.  
"  EXPECTED RESULT--The transformer tap changer goes to full or partial 
boost.  The voltage on the NB bus goes high.  When the voltage goes high 
enough, the voltage at the NG Load Centers goes high and alarm in the 
Control Room. The capacitor banks will not interact.  Gear driven limit switch 
prevents movement of tap to greater than 4% boost.Attachment 2 to 
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Case 2  Failure mechanisms that cause the transformer tap changer to fail and 
lower the NB bus voltage unexpectedly.  
"*  Tap changer control circuit failure mechanisms.  
"*  The tap changer primary and back up voltage controllers fail high.  
"*  The tap changer primary and back-up controller potential transformer fail 
high.  
"  EXPECTED RESULT--The transformer tap changer goes to full or partial 
buck (subtraction) and the NB bus voltage decreases.  The capacitor banks 
will step on to raise voltage dependant on the magnitude of the voltage drop.  
If the voltage is low enough, alarms are produced in the control room.  If the 
low voltage actuates the Class  lE degraded voltage circuits, after the 
appropriate time interval, (8 seconds during a LOCA or 119  seconds during 
non-LOCA) the NB bus(es) are shed from the off-site power system and 
loaded onto the associated emergency diesel generator.  Gear driven limit 
switch prevents movement of tap to less than 6%  buck (subtraction).  
Case 3  Failure mechanisms that cause the tap changer to fail to move.  
"  Tap changer control circuit failure mechanisms.  
"•  The tap changer primary controller locks up.  
"*  The tap changer back-up controller fails and blocks the primary controller 
signals.  
"*  The tap changer motor or power supply fails.  
"*  The tap changer primary and back-up controller potential  transformers fail 
low.  
"*  The primary or secondary fuses for the voltage sensing transformers fail.  
"*  EXPECTED RESULT--The  transformer tap changer fails to move.  The LTC 
self test alarm is annunciated through the XFMR trouble annunciator in the 
control room.  The voltage on the NB bus may go high or low dependant on 
grid voltage changes.  If the NB voltage goes high enough, the voltage at the 
NG Load Centers goes high and alarm in the Control Room.  If the NB bus 
voltage goes low enough, the capacitor banks may step on.  If the voltage is 
still too low, it alarms in the control room and after the appropriate time 
interval, 8 seconds during a LOCA or 119 seconds during non-LOCA, Class 
1  E circuits shed the NB bus(es) from the off-site power system and load onto 
the associated emergency diesel generator.
11t
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Case 4  Failure mechanisms that cause the high side and / or low side 
transformer breakers to trip or isolate the transformer from the NB  bus.  
"  Internal and external faults: 
"*  Phase to ground short which occurs on the transformer primary 13.8 kV 
circuits.  
"*  Phase to phase short which occurs on the transformer primary 13.8 kV 
circuits 
"*  A single phase opens on the transformer primary  13.8 kV circuits.  
"*  Phase to ground short which occurs on the transformer secondary 4.16 kV 
circuits.  
"*  Phase to phase short which occurs on the transformer  secondary 4.16 kV 
circuits 
"*  A single phase opens on the transformer secondary 4.16 kV circuits.  
"*  A fault internal to the transformer.  
"  EXPECTED RESULT--The  protective relays for the associated NB 
transformer trip the  13.8 kV transformer feeder breaker and /or low side 
breaker(s) or Class 1  E voltage relays actuate causing a transfer of the Class  1  E 
NB bus to the associated emergency diesel generator.  The capacitor bank is 
isolated along with the transformer.  
Review of the failure cases listed above confirms that expected system responses are 
enveloped  by the existing accident analysis except for the bus overvoltage issues in Case 
1 and 3.  Although not specifically discussed in the FSAR, limited bus overvoltage  is an 
analyzed and accepted failure mode when within accepted limits.  
4.3  Overvoltage Considerations: 
Overvoltage may occur if the Beckwith M-2001B LTC voltage controller fails giving an 
increase tap signal and the Beckwith back-up control relay M-0329B  fails to block and 
run back the tap changer. This is not a likely occurrence.  A Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment, using manufacturer-provided meantime between failure (MTBF) data for the 
devices (MTBF  110 years for the primary controller and 296 years for the backup 
controller), results in an incremental conditional core damage frequency of 1.50E-8/year 
based on common cause failure of the primary controllers and the backup controllers.  
This frequency is three orders of magnitude below the existing core damage frequency.  
Thus, the design provides overvoltage control and protection whose simultaneous  failure 
probability for both the voltage regulator and the back-up protection relay to fail is 
sufficiently low so that the overvoltage protection will be assumed to exist and provide 
protection.t
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This overvoltage hazard is not new as the grid; main generator and emergency diesel 
generators may also cause high voltages given component failures.  These failures 
however have not been quantified or discussed in the FSAR and have been accepted as is.  
These hazards would have a low probability of occurrence.  
In addition, design features also exist to identify failures and limit failure duration.  These 
are the following features: 
"*  The voltage controller is provided with a self-test alarm that determines the 
functionality of the device.  This will have annunciation to detect the 
operational failure.  
"•  The back-up protection relay will identify the controller failure when out-of
control range voltages occur.  This is annunciated in the control room.  
"•  The voltage controller and back up control relay are fed from separate potential 
transformers and fuses.  
"*  The devices separately identify a voltage loss and inhibit voltage raise 
functions.  This condition is identified by annunciation.  
"*  The devices will have periodic testing to ensure their proper operation.  
A significant number of nuclear power plant units incorporate the use of automatic load 
tap changing transformer to supply power to the Class lE power systems.  A number of 
these sites were contacted.  Callaway's design was found to be equivalent or superior to 
these units.  Most of the LTC transformers  had been in service since issuance of their 
plant operating licenses and thus have considerable operating history.  No adverse 
operations, which caused overvoltages in their plants, were noted due to controller 
failures.  Thus, the automatic  load tap changing transformer  design is not new to the 
nuclear industry and has not been found to be a credible hazard.  
AmerenUE has performed an overvoltage study.  Results indicate that at worst case 
conditions, (high grid voltage, LTC controller failure causing uncontrolled boost, and 
back up protection relay failure.), equipment damage will not occur for several minutes.  
Load flow analyses performed for loads present during a loss of coolant accident indicates 
that the overvoltage hazard will not occur.  This overvoltage  study combined with the low 
probability of occurrence  seen in the PRA analysis further indicate the overvoltage 
condition is not a credible new accident.  
Furthermore, the LTC failure effects are limited to the associated ESF train, therefore this 
type of failure meets the definition of a single failure as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix 
A for operation under normal  (Non T/S action) conditions.Attachment 2 to 
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4.4  System Operation and Coordination: 
For normal operation (both LTCs and capacitor banks OPERABLE and both ESF 
transformers in service), the contingency computer Callaway watch guard alarm is set to 
approximately 333 kV to provide a 3 kV margin above the new minimum switchyard 
voltage documented in reference  7.10.  The 3 kV margin allows time for ESO to contact 
the Callaway Control Room and to take actions to restore the minimum grid voltage 
before it drops below the Callaway operational requirement.  Similarly for each possible 
line-up in Table 2, the ESO watch guard alarm is changed to give an approximate 3  kV 
margin depending on the plant configuration.  
The replacement transformers combined with the existing capacitor banks are part of the 
offsite power system that provides power with adequate voltage to the safety related NB 
system.  The LTC voltage control system is coordinated with the existing capacitor bank 
voltage control system.  However, they are separate control systems.  Each component 
functions without the other.  The transformer voltage control point is coordinated with its 
associated capacitor bank voltage control point to assure that the capacitor bank steps are 
off during times that the NB bus is near its nominal 4.16 kV level.  Figure  1 represents 
the voltage operation of the capacitor banks and the LTCs.  
The new transformer with automatic load tap changer, in conjunction with the installed  6 
MVAr capacitor bank, provides voltage support for the associated Class  1E NB bus.  This 
is accomplished by making tap changes, as required, to maintain an acceptable NB bus 
voltage.  The voltage control range for the new transformer will be coordinated with the 
existing capacitor bank controls as shown in the figure  1 below to assure that the 
capacitor bank steps are off when the transformer is operating in its nominal control band.  
The control of the tap changer will be automatic, based on the secondary voltage of the 
transformer.  The control circuits will be designed to limit the probability of either an 
under voltage or over voltage failure by using a Beckwith M-200 lB primary controller 
and Beckwith M-0329B backup controller.  The Beckwith 2001B is set to control the 
secondary voltage at 4165 ±31.5V.  The Beckwith M-0329B backup relay will block tap 
changer signals to raise voltage if the secondary voltage is above 4305V and create a tap 
changer signal to lower voltage if the secondary voltage is above 4375V.  The Beckwith 
M-0329B backup relay will block tap changer signals to lower voltage if the secondary 
voltage is below 4025V.  The first tap change will take a minimum of 2.5 seconds with 
subsequent steps taking about 2 seconds.  Each step will vary the NB bus voltage by 
approximately  1%.  The control settings in Figure  1 are established by load-flow analysis.Attachment  2 to 
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Figure 1 
LTC and Capacitor Bank Voltage Control
Overvoltage  runback 
4347Vac (Beckwith  M-2001B)
Block  Raise  4247 Vac(Beckwith  M-2001B)
LIC loop  error (44.4 Vac) 
LTC  Operating band without error 
Beckwith  M2001B 
LTC  loop error (44.4 Vac) 
4083.7 Vac 
Capacitor bank  control  error ( 98.7 Vac) 
Under voltge block  limit=4025  Vac 
(Beckwith M-0329B) 
Capacitor bank control  band 
Capacitor bank  control  error (  98.7 Vac) 
3016.3 Vac  -
Overvoltage  runback  limit=4375  Vac (Beckwith  M-0329B) 
Overvoltage  block  limit=4305 Vac  (Beckwith  M-0329B) 
- NB bus  continuous high voltage  limit=4247 Vac 
LTC  high  drift voltage=4241  Vac 
- 4196.5 Vac 
bandcenter =4165 Vac 
- 4133.5 Vac 
- LTC low  drift voltage  = 4009Vac 
- Fast step high high voltage  control  point=405OVac 
(back-up  step  off control) 
Slow step high voltage  control  point=3985 Vac 
Step  on  or off voltage  change =41.6 Vac 
Lowvoltage  control  point =3915Vac 
NB bus  low voltage  limit =3800  Vac
With both systems in operation, the general response to a LOCA is for the capacitor bank 
to provide a rapid voltage increase if needed and then the LTC will step to correct the 
voltage back to a 4.16 kV level and thus turn the capacitor bank off. The voltage control 
systems function to ensure that the voltage at NB01 and NB02  is sufficient to reset the 
safety related degraded voltage relays and loss of voltage relays before time limits are 
exceeded.  With this, the preferred off site power sources are retained to power the safety 
related electrical distribution system.  The voltage control systems also function to ensure 
that overvoltages are not present in the safety related electrical distribution system when 
fed from the preferred power sources.  
The transformer automatic  load tap changer control circuits, like the capacitor bank 
control circuits, will be interlocked with its respective Emergency Diesel Generator to 
"freeze" automatic actions and thereby prevent adverse system interactions  during 
Emergency Diesel Generator testing.  A Diesel Generator "freeze" interlock signal will be 
added to an annunciator window in the Control Room to confirm proper tap changer 
system interface.Attachment 2 to 
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In addition, Control Room annunciators are provided to indicate if the load tap changers 
or capacitor bank control circuits are not in automatic.  Automatic control is needed to 
obtain the voltage control from the component.  
Control Room annunciators will be used to provide indication of system trouble.  A 
multi-point annunciator will be provided at each transformer to allow the quick 
determination of the cause of the trouble signal.  
Operating procedures will address appropriate responses to control room and local 
annunciators.  
Safety related circuit breakers provide the means of disconnecting the transformers from 
the safety related NB bus in the event of equipment maintenance  or failure.  
Per 1OCFR50 Appendix A GDC 17 criteria, a design shall be provided to minimize to the 
extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and 
postulated accident and environmental conditions.  As such, physical and electrical 
separation is provided.  The LTC transformers do not share any common electrical or 
control circuits and they cannot be paralleled even if the Class 1  E 4.16kV Busses NB0 1 
and NB02 are cross-connected.  Therefore, the probability that simultaneous failures of 
both transformers to cause both offsite sources to become inoperable is negligible.  
4.4.1  Manual Operation of LTCs: 
The LTC's controller can be operated manually in the event the automatic system fails.  
This is accomplished locally at the transformers using the local control panel.  As seen on 
FSAR Figure  1.2-1 the transformers are in relatively  close proximity to the main control 
room.  Additionally, the tap changers can be manipulated using a hand crank without the 
control system.  However, due to equipment and personnel safety concerns the 
manufacturer recommends this manual manipulation be performed  with the transformer 
de-energized.  
Since the probability of failure of the LTC controllers is very low, the local manual 
actions are considered to be acceptable given the guidelines of NRC Information Notice 
97-078, dated 10/23/97.  No timed operator responses are assumed in the design.  
Manual actions will be documented in plant operating procedures including normal, off
normal and annunciator response procedures.  
As stated in the cover letter, AmerenUE has evaluated and approved installation and 
operation of the transformers with the automatic LTC fixed per  10 CFR 50.59.  This 
configuration will be implemented in procedures and design documents if thisAttachment 2 to 
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amendment request is not approved prior to plant restart following Refuel  11.  The 
optimal tap setting has been derived using load flow analysis.  
4.5  Testing And Maintenance: 
The inspections testing and maintenance  described below demonstrate continuing 
compliance with General Design Criteria 18, Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power 
Systems.  Testing and maintenance  discussed below may be modified with appropriate 
engineering reviews.  
4.5.1  Planned Post Modification Testing 
The testing described includes all functions required to ensure appropriate operation of 
the LTC in the automatic mode after the unit is returned to service in manual mode after 
RF  11,  until this amendment request is approved.  These tests are performed on out of 
service equipment.  This testing is not considered part of the Unreviewed  Safety 
Question, this test summary is provided for information.  
Post modification testing plans include: 
ESF Transformers: 
"*  Transformer inspection and core ground test 
"*  Transformer dew point test prior to filling 
"*  Filter and degassification of transformer oil 
"*  Turns ratio verification, all windings 
"*  Insulation power factor testing 
"*  Winding resistance verification 
"*  Sudden pressure relay calibration 
"*  Winding vs oil temperature verification, no load 
"*  Vacuum bleeder test 
"*  Nitrogen gas system test that system maintains pressure 
"*  Thermal switches for fan control and alarm, low and low-low level alarm switches 
should be checked for proper operation.  
Tap Changer: 
"*  Visual inspection 
"*  Operating range verification to design requirements 
"*  Manual handle inhibition of automatic tap changer verification 
"•  Vacuum bottle sensing units should be checked by applying 20 amps current though 
the sensor and verified that the tap changer does not complete a step but returns to the 
previous position.Attachment 2 to 
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Transformer Controls: 
"*  Scheme checks 
"*  Protective relaying calibration 
"*  Low voltage wiring insulation check per plant procedures 
Functional Testing: 
"*  Fan Operation 
"*  Panel heater test 
"*  Sudden pressure and low level relay trip checks trip high and low side breakers 
"*  Transformer control and annunciator functions 
"*  Transformer LTC and Capacitor bank coordination 
"*  Test transformer controls for radio interference.  
Energized Tests for Operability: 
Modes 5 & 6 Operability Specific Test procedure 
Modes  1, 2, 3, 4 complete ESFAS testing procedures performed during Refuel  11: 
Testing required for operability of offsite sources for Modes  1, 2, 3, & 4: 
"*  Capacitor bank in service, LTC in manual on -4%  tap, perform Safety Injection 
without Blackout ESFAS test in accordance with ESFAS procedures.  
"*  Capacitor bank in service, LTC in automatic, perform SI without Blackout ESFAS 
test in accordance with ESFAS procedures.  
"*  LTC in automatic, capacitor bank out of service, perform SI without Blackout ESFAS 
test in accordance with ESFAS procedures.  
Tests with transformers disconnected  from ESF bus: 
"*  High and low side controller voltages 
"*  Apply signal to cause LTC to move through range as designed 
"*  Energize associated capacitor bank for 12 hour heat run 
Tests with transformers connected to bus: 
"*  Phase check prior to bus connection 
"*  Individual starts of RHR, CCW and ESW pumps 
"*  A high current test should be completed to verify CT phasing and ratio of inputs to 
the differential relays.  
4.5.2  Operational  Inspection, Testing to assure continued functionality 
"*  Monthly trending on the transformer gas pressure verses oil temperature is performed.  
"*  Semi-annual oil samples are taken for total gas in oil and fluid analysisk.
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"*  Semi-annually the transformers are inspected thermographically 
"*  Every other refuel the transformers and bushings are power factored 
"*  Every other refuel the transformer tap changer controls will be operated through out 
its range 
"*  Every other refuel the capacitor banks will be operated placing all banks in service 
"*  Every other refuel the protective relays and devices on the capacitor banks and 
transformers are calibrated.  
"*  Every other refuel  a trip check is performed verifying the function of the high and low 
side breakers from manipulation of transformer protective devices.  
"*  Every other year the low and high side transformer cables are meggared.  
5.0  REGULATORY  ANALYSIS 
5.1  No Significant Hazards Determination 
AmerenUE has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved 
with the proposed changes by focusing on the three standards set forth in 
10 CFR 50.92(c) as discussed below: 
1.  Does the proposed change involve a significant increase  in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated? 
Response:  No 
Based on the review of the modification details there is an insignificant increase 
in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, however 
there is no increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.  The 
modification has no effect on the radiological consequences of accidents 
previously evaluated.  Installation of the LTCs does not impact accident initiators 
though a failure mode has been identified that can increase the probability of 
malfunction, a risk study shows this risk is insignificant.  
2.  Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated? 
Response:  No 
The overall effect of the malfunction of the LTC controllers would lead to a loss 
of the associated ESF bus which is not a new failure mode that can lead to a new 
or different kind of accident than previously evaluated.  The LTC failure effects 
are limited to the associated ESF train, therefore this type of failure meets the 
definition of a single failure as defined in 10  CFR 50 Appendix A for operationAttachment 2 to 
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under normal (Non T/S action) conditions.  Additionally, during the 10CFR  50.59 
evaluation for the LTCs criteria (a)(2)(ii) with respect to accidents of a different 
type was not met.  
3.  Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? 
Response: No 
The installation of the replacement transformers with load tap changers will help 
assure the required minimum NB bus voltage established by Reference  7.10 under 
a wider variation of grid voltage.  
Current Technical  Specification Bases for the offsite power distribution system are 
covered in sections B3.8.1--AC  Sources - Operating, B3.8.9-Distribution Systems 
Operating, B3.8.2-AC Sources - Shutdown, and B3.8.10--Distribution Systems 
Shutdown.  These bases ensure that sufficient power will be available to supply the 
safety-related equipment required for: (1) The safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) The 
mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified 
independent and redundant AC power and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of 
General Design Criterion  17 of Appendix A to  10 CFR Part 50.  The ACTIONS sections 
of the applicable Technical  Specifications provide requirements specified for various 
levels of degradation of the power sources and provide restrictions upon continued 
facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation.  The Operability of the 
power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses 
and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite AC power sources 
and associated distribution systems operable  during accident conditions coincident with 
an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite AC source.  
The installation of the transformers with automatic  load tap changers reduces the 
possibility of the loss of the offsite power system due to the increased grid voltage 
variations as documented in the description of the change in section 4.1.4.  Therefore, the 
installation of the transformers with load tap changers will not reduce the margin of 
safety.  
Conclusion: 
Based on the above evaluations,  AmerenUE concludes that the activities associated with 
the above described changes present no significant hazards under the standards  set forth 
in 10 CFR 50.92 and that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the 
public will not be endangered by the proposed change.  Moreover, because this change 
does not involve a significant hazards consideration, it will also not result in a condition 
which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the 
NRC Final Environmental  Statement as stated in Section 6.
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5.2  Regulatory Safety Analysis 
Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 
10  CFR 50.34(b)(2)  regarding the Callaway FSAR continues to be met with the proposed 
update to the Callaway FSAR in Attachment  3.  Additionally, the required level of detail 
in Attachment 3  has been determined to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71 (e), per 
the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.70 and  1.181.  
Callaway Plant License Condition C(5)(d) allows changes to the Fire Protection Program 
to be made without prior approval if the change does not adversely affect the ability to 
achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.  The analysis reflected in 
Section 4.1.3 demonstrates compliance of the new design to this criterion.  
10 CFR 50.36 sets forth requirements for the Technical Specification contents.  
AmerenUE has determined that there are no changes to the Technical  Specifications  as 
part of the activities related to this Amendment.  The existing Technical  Specifications 
testing will demonstrate availability of the off-site power with the new transformers with 
LTCs.  
10 CFR 50.36(a) requires that the Technical  Specifications have a summary statement of 
the bases or reasons for such specifications, but shall not become part of the Technical 
Specifications.  The markups of the Callaway Technical  Specification Bases included in 
Attachment 4 are intended to reflect the new configuration of the Callaway electrical 
distribution system.  These changes are to be implemented in accordance  with the 
Callaway Technical  Specification Bases Control Program as stated in Callaway Technical 
Specification 5.5.14.  
10 CFR 50.59 allows licensees to make changes to the facility and procedures described 
in the FSAR, to conduct tests and experiments not described in the FSAR, as long as 
these activities do not change Technical Specifications  or meet the criteria stated in  10 
CFR 50.59 (c)(2).  This amendment request is being submitted in accordance  with 10 
CFR 50.59 due to the criteria of (c)(2)(i) and (ii) are met with respect to the malfunction 
of equipment important to safety.  Therefore, the requirements of 1OCFR 50.59 are being 
met. The automatic LTC feature on the new ESF transformers cannot be operable and in
service without approval of this amendment request.  The description added to the 
Callaway FSAR, Attachment 3,  for this amendment (as approved) will ensure  10 CFR 
50.59 is applied to future changes to the system.  
10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power.  This requirement continues to be 
met and was evaluated as stated in Section 4.1.2.Attachment  2 to 
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10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, GDC 17 
Electric Power Systems.  As stated in Section 4 the applicable portions of GDC  17 
continue to be satisfied by the installation of the new ESF transformers with LTCs.  
10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, GDC 18 
Inspection Testing Electric Power Systems.  As stated in Section 4.5 the applicable 
portions of GDC  18 will continue to be satisfied by testing post modification and 
preventive maintenance on a continuing basis commensurate  with the inspection and 
testing of the current design.  
Analysis: 
Applicable regulatory requirements/criteria  continue to be met.  
Conclusion: 
The proposed LAR is in compliance  with the above-cited regulations.  
6.0  ENVIRONMENTAL  EVALUATION 
This amendment request reflects an unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with 
the replacement of the ESF transformers with transformers having automatic load tap 
changers.  The USQ is associated with the portions of criteria (a)(2) (i)  and (ii) of 10 CFR 
50.59 related to the malfunction of equipment important to safety.  This modification 
does not introduce new accidents or affect consequences of accidents or malfunctions.  
Section 4.1.3 demonstrates addition of the larger transformers over the retention pit under 
the transformers will not adversely affect the environment.  
These amendment request involves changes with respect to the use of the facility 
components located within the restricted area, as defined in 1OCFR20.  AmerenUE has 
determined that the proposed amendment does not involve: 
(1)  A significant hazard consideration, as discussed in Section 5 of this Attachment; 
(2)  A significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any 
effluents that that may be released offsite; 
(3)  A significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational  radiation 
exposure.  
Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical 
exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).  Pursuant to  10 CFR 51.22(b), noAttachment 2 to 
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environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in 
connection with the issuance of this amendment.  
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8.0  PRECEDENTS 
Pacific Gas & Electric  Submittal dated,  1/14/98 
NRC Amendments:  132 Diablo Canyon  1  (DPR-82),  130 Diablo Canyon 2, dated 4/29/99 
Illinois Power Submittal dated, 5/20/98 
NRC Amendment:  116 Clinton Power Station (NPF-62), dated  10/1/98 
These precedents are provided to show recent NRC reviews of design changes relating to 
the use of load tap changing transformers.  Similarities to the above amendments are 
limited due to grid configurations, multiple unit sites, and electrical system 
configurations.Attachment 3 to 
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EXISTING MARKED-UP FSAR PAGES 
(FSAR CN 00-045) 
List 
Standard Plant FSAR: 
Page  1.2-14 
Page  1.2-15 
Figure  1.2-1 
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Figure 1.2-44 
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Page 8.1-4 
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AmerenUE Drawing E-21NB01  (Incorporated by Reference from page 8.2-2) 
AmerenUE Drawing E-21NB02 (Incorporated by Reference from page 8.2-2) 
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Page 8.3-2 
Page 8.3-3 
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Page 8.3-4 
Page 8.3-5 
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Table 8.3-4 Sheet 4 
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Figure 8.3-1 
Figure 8.3-1  (Revised) 
Figure 8.3-3 
Figure 8.3-3 (Revised) 
Page 9.5.1-20 
Page 9.5.1-21 
Site Addendum FSAR: 
Figure 2.1-3 
Page  8.2-2CALLAWAY  - SP  1'T•  /0/•  e15O 
1.2.6.3  Radiation  Monitorinq  System 
The  liquid  and  gaseous  effluents  from  the  plant  are  continuously 
monitored  for  radioactivity.  Release  rates  are  monitored  and 
recorded.  The  process  radiation  monitoring  system  detects 
radioactivity  in  fluid  systems  which  is  indicative  of  fuel  clad 
defects  and/or  fluid  leakage  between  process  systems.  
Area  monitoring  stations  are  provided  to  measure  gamma  radiation 
at  selected  locations  in  the  plant.  Radiation  levels,  as 
detected  by  these  monitors,  are  indicated  in  the  control  room, 
and  above  normal  values  are  annunciated.ý" 
1.2.6.4  Balance-of-Plant  Instrumentation  and  Control  Systems 
The  turbine  and  generator  control  systems  are  designed  to 
regulate  generator  load.  The  turbine-generator  protection  system 
is  designed  to  ensure  safe  operation  of  the  unit.  
Additional  instrumentation  and  controls  allow  manual  or  automatic 
control  of  various  temperatures,  pressures,  flows,  and  liquid 
levels  throughout  the  plant.  Indicators,  recorders, 
annunciators,  and  the  plant  computer  inform  the  operating 
personnel  at the  equipment  location  and/or  the  control  room  of 
plant  conditions  and  performance.  
1.2.7  PLANT  ELECTRIC  POWER  SYSTEM 
1.2.7.1  Transmission  and  Generation  Systems 
The  generating  unit  is  connected  to  the  utility  transmission 
system.  The  Union  Electric  Co.  transmission  systemnvoltage  is 
345  kV.  Union  Electric  has  integrated  transmission  networks  and 
interconnections  with  neighboring  systems.  A  description  of 
system  network  and  interconnection  is  given  in  Chapter  8.0.  
The  main  generator  is  a  General  Electric  1,800  rpm,  three-phase, 
60-cycle  synchronous  unit.  The  generator  is  connected  directly 
to  the  turbine  shaft  and  is  equipped  with  an  excitation  system 
coupled  directly  to  the  generator  shaft.  
Power  from  the  generator  is  stepped  up  from  25  kV  by  the  main 
transformer  and  supplied  by  overhead  lines  to  the  switchyard.  An  I 
auxiliary  transformer  is  connected  to  the  main  generator  through 
an  isolated phase  bus  duct  to  supply  the  auxiliary  loads  of  the 
plant  during  power  generation.  
1.2.7.2  Electric  Power  Distribution  System 
Electric  power  is  supplied  from  the  switchyard  to  the  on-site 
power  system  for  the  electrical  auxiliaries  through  two 
independent  circuits.  One  circuit  supplies  power  through  a 
startup  transformer  and  the  other  through  an  engineered  safety 
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features  (ESF)  transformer.  The  startup  transformer  feeds  two 
13.8-kV  busses  and  a  second  ESF  transformer.  Power  is  supplied 
to  auxiliaries  at  13.8  kV,  4.16  kV,  480  V,  480/277  V  and  208/120 
V  ac.  Refer  to  Figure  8.3-1.  
The  power  distribution  system  includes  the  Class  IE  and 
non-Class  IE  ac  and  dc  power  systems.  The  Class  IE  power  system 
supplies  equipment  used  to  shut  down  the  reactor  and  limit  the 
release  of  radioactive  material  following  a  design  basis  event.  
The  Class  IE  ac  system  consists  of  two  independent  and  redundant 
load  groups  and  four  independent  120-V  vital  ac  instrumentation 
and  control  power  supply  systems.  The  load  groups  include 
4.16-kV  switchgear,  480-V  load  centers,  and  motor  control 
centers.  
Two  diesel  generators  are  provided  as  a  standby  power  source,  one 
for  each  of  the  two  Class  IE  load  groups.  Each  generator  has 
sufficient  capacity  to  operate  all  the  equipment  of  one  load 
group,  which  is  necessary  to  prevent  undue  risk  to public  health 
and  safety  in  the  event  of  a  design  basis  accident.  
The  non-Class  IE  ac  system  includes  13.8-kV  switchgear,  4.16-kV 
switchgear,  480-V  load  centers,  and  motor  control  centers.  
The  vital  ac  instrumentation  and  control  power  supply  systems 
include  battery  systems,  static  inverters,  and  distribution 
panels.  All  voltages  listed  are  nominal  values,  and  all 
electrical  Class  IE  equipment  is  designed  to  accept  the  expected 
range  in  voltage.  
The  Class  IE  electrical  systems  are  similar  to  Class  IE  systems 
utilized  on  many  other  Bechtel-designed  plants  since  designs  that 
meet  the  requirements  and  standards  of  the  nuclear  industry 
develop  in  a  similar  manner.  The  Class  IE  dc  systems  and 
components  are  similar  to  the  dc  systems  and  components  at  Palo 
Verde.  
Direct current power for  the  Class  IE  dc  loads  is  supplied  by 
four  independent  Class  IE  125-V  dc  batteries  and  associated 
battery  chargers.  One  250-V  and  two  125-V  non-Class  IE  batteries 
and  associated  battery  chargers  are  also  provided  to  supply  250-V 
and  125-V  dc  power  for  the  non-Class  IE  dc  system  loads.  
1.2.8  POWER  CONVERSION  SYSTEM 
Thermal  energy  that  is  generated  by  the  NSSS  is  converted  into 
electrical  energy  through  the  steam  cycle  process  by  the  turbine 
generator.  
The  turbine  is  a  tandem-compound,  six-flow,  four-element, 
1,800-rpm  unit,  having  one  high-pressure  and  three  low-pressure 
elements.  Combination  moisture  separator-reheaters  are  employed 
to  dry  and  reheat  the  steam  between  the  high-  and  low-pressure 
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CHAPTER R.LJ1  A 
ELECTRIC  POWRR 
8.1  TNfRODTTCTTnN 
8.1.1  UTILITY  GRID  DESCRIPTION 
The  generator  units  are  connected  to  the respective 
transmission  systems.  The  transmission  system  voltage  is 
345  kV  for  Callaway.  The  utility  has  integrated  transmission 
networks  and  interconnections  with  neighboring  systems.  A 
description  of  the  system  network  and  interconnections  is.given 
in  Section  8.1.1  of the  Site  Addendum.  
8.1.2  ONSITE  POWER  SYSTEM  DESCRIPTION 
The  onsite  power  system  is  provided  with preferred (offsite) 
power  from  the offsite  system  through  two  independent  and 
redundant  sources  of  power.  One  preferred  circuit  from  the 
switchyard  supplies  power  to  a  three-winding  startup 
transformer.  This  startup  transformer  feeds  two  medium-voltage 
13.8-kV  busses  and  a  13.8/4.16-kV  ESF  transforme r  wit  1 
associated  capacitor  bank.  The  second  preferred  (offsite) 
circuit  is  connected  to the  second  13.8/4.16-kV  ESF  transformer 
with  its  associated  capacitor  bank..  Each  transformer  normally * 
supplies  its  associated  medium  voltage  4.16-kV  Class  IE  bus.  
Refer  to  Figure  8.3-1.  
The  two  13.8-kV  busses  supply  power  to  the nonsafety-related 
auxiliary  loads  of  the  unit.  The'13.8-kV  busses  are  also 
connected  to  a  three-winding  unit  auxiliary  transformer,  in 
addition  to the  startup  transformer.  The  unit  auxiliary 
transformer  is  connected  to the  main  generator  through  an 
isolated  phase  bus  duct.  
Two  4.16-kV  non-Class  IE  busses  are  supplied  power  from  two 
13.8-kV  busses  through  two  13.8/4.16-kV  station  service 
transformers.  
Non-Class  IE  low-voltage  480-V  loads  are  supplied  power  from 
two  13.8-kV  busses  through  480-V  load  centers  and  480-V  motor 
control  centers.  
The  onsite  power  system  is  divided  into  two  separate  load 
groups,  each  load  group  consisting  of  an  arrangement  of  busses, 
transformers,  switching  equipment,  and  loads  fed  from  a  common 
power  supply.  Power  is  supplied  to auxiliaries  at  13.8  kV, 
4.16  kV,  480  V,  480/277  V,  208/120  V,  120  V  ac,  250  V  dc,  and 
125  V  dc.  
The  onsite  standby  power  system  includes  the  Class  IE  ac  and  dc 
power  for  equipment  used  to maintain  a  cold  shutdown  of  the 
plant  and  to mitigate  the  consequences  of  a  DBA.  
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Class  IE  ac  system  loads  are  separated  into  two  load  groups  which  are  powered  from  separate  ESF  transformers  or  two  inde-'  pendent  diesel  generators  (one  per  load  group).  Each  load  group  distributes  power  by  a  4.16-kV  bus,  480-V  load  centers,  and  480-V  motor  control  centers.  
The  Class  IE  dc  system  provides  four  separate  125-V  dc  battery  supplies  per  unit for  Class  IE  controls,  instrumentation,  power,  and  control  inverters.  Refer  to  Figure  8.3-6.  
8.1.3  SAFETY-RELATED  LOADS 
Refer  to  Figure  8.3-2  for  a  listing of  loads  supplied  by  the  Class  IE  ac  system.  Refer  to  Table  8.3-1  for  a  list  of  loads  supplied  by  the  Class  IE  dc  system.  The  loads  and  their  safety  functions  are  identified  in  the  above  references.  
8.1.4  DESIGN  BASES 
8.1.4.1  Offsite  Power  System 
8.1.4.1.1  Safety  Design  Bases 
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  ONE  - Electrical  power  from  the  power  grid  to  the plant  site  is  supplied  by  two  physically  independent  circuits  designed  and  located  so  as  to  minimize  the  likelihood  of  simultaneous  failure.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  TWO  - Each  of these  independent  circuits  has  the  capability  to  safely  shut  down  the  unit.  The  first  preferred  circuit,  which  is  connected  to  the  startup  trans former,  has  the  capacity  to  supply  the startup  and  all the  auxiliary  loads  (both  group  1  and  group  2  simultaneously)  of 
the  unit.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  THREE  - The  second  preferred  power  circuit,  which  supplies  power  to the  ESF  transformer,  has  the  capacity  to  supply  all  the  safety-related  loads  of the  unit.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  FOUR  - The  loss  of  the nuclear  unit  or the  most  critical  unit  on  the  grid will  not result  in  the  loss  of  offsite  power  to  the  Class  IE  busses.  
8.1.4.1.2  Power  Generation  Design  Bases 
POWER  GENERATION  DESIGN  BASIS  ONE  - The  switchyard  power  circuit breaker  control  for  345-kV  breakers  is  designed with  duplicate  and  redundant  systems,  i.e.,  two  independent  battery  systems,  two  trip  coils  per  breaker,  and  two  independent  protective  relay  schemes.  
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SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  ONE  - The  onsite  power  system  includes  a 
separate  and  independent  Class  IE  electric  power  system  for 
each  unit  (GDC-17).  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  TWO  - The  onsite  Class  IE  electric  power 
system  is  divided  into  two  independent  load  groups,  each  with 
its  own  power  supply,  busses,  transformers,  loads,  and 
associated  125-V  dc  control  power.  Each  load  group  is 
independently  capable  of  maintaining  the  plant  in  a  cold 
shutdown  (GDC-17).  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  THREE  - One  independent  diesel  generator  is 
provided  for  each  Class  IE  ac  load  group  in  each  unit.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  FOUR  - No  provisions  are  made  for  automatic 
transfer  of  load  groups  between  redundant  power  sources.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  FIVE  - No  portion  (ac  or  dc)  of  the  onsite 
standby  power  systems  is  shared  between  units  (GDC-5).  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  SIX  - The  Class  IE  electric  systems  are 
designed  to  satisfy the  single  failure  criterion  (GDC-17).  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  SEVEN  - For  each  of  four  protection 
channels,  one  independent  125-V  dc  and  one  120-V  vital  ac  power 
source  are  provided.  Batteries  are  sized  for  200  minutes  of 
operation  without  the  support  of  battery  chargers.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  EIGHT  - Raceways  are  not  shared  by  Class  IE 
and  non-Class  IE  cables.  However,  associated  cables  connected 
to  Class  IE  busses  are  treated  as  Class  IE  cables  with  regard 
to  separation  and  identification  and  are  run  in  their related 
Class  IE  raceway  system.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  NINE  - Special  identification  criteria  are 
applied  for  Class  IE  equipment,  including  cabling  and  raceways.  
Refer  to  Section  8.3.1.3.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  TEN  - Separation  criteria  are  applied  which 
establish  requirements  for  preserving  the  independence  of 
redundant  Class  IE  load  groups  or  power  systems.  Refer  to 
Section  8.3.1.4.1.  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  ELEVEN  - Class  IE  equipment  is  designed 
with the  capability  of  being  tested  periodically  (GDC-18).  
SAFETY  DESIGN  BASIS  TWELVE  - Two  physically  and  electrically 
independent  ESF  transformers  with associated  capacitor  banks 
are  provided  to  supply  the  Class  IE  ac  electric  power  system 
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8.1.4.2.2  Power  Generation  Design  Bases 
POWER  GENERATION  DESIGN  BASIS  ONE  - A  separate  non-Class  IE  dc 
system  is  provided  for  non-Class  IE  controls  and  dc  motors.  
8.1.4.3  Design Criteria. Rtgn.1ataxy r•iiidg-,.  and  TEEE Standards, 
The  onsite  power  system  is  generally  designed  in  accordance 
with  IEEE  Standards  279,  308,  317,  323,  334,  344,  379,  382, 
383,  384,  387,  450,  and  484.  
Compliance  with  Regulatory  Guides  1.6,  1.9,  1.22,  1.29,  1.30, 
1.32,  1.40,  1.41,  1.47,  1.53,  1.62,  1.63,  1.68,  1.73,  1.75, 
1.81,  1.89,  1.93,  1.100, 1.106,  1.108,  1.118,  and  1.131  and 
IEEE  Standards  323-1974,  338-1971,  344-1975,  384-1974, 
387-1977,  308-1974,  and  317-1976  are  discussed  below: 
Refer  to  Appendix  3A  for the  applicable  revision  dates  on 
regulatory  guides.  
Compliance  with  General  Design  Criteria  17  and  18  is  discussed 
in  Section  3.1  and  Section  8.2  of  the  Site  Addendum  FSAR.  
REGULATORY  GUIDE  1.6,  INDEPENDENCE  BETWEEN  REDUNDANT  STANDBY 
(ONSITE)  POWER  SOURCES  AND  BETWEEN  THEIR  DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEMS  - The  Class  IE  system  is  divided  into  redundant  load 
groups  so  that  loss  of  any  one  group  will  not  prevent  the 
minimum  safety  functions  from  being  performed.  Figure  8.3-1 
shows  this  arrangement.  
Each  ac  load  group  has  connections  to  two  preferred  (offsite) 
power  supplies  and  to  a  single  diesel  generator.  Each  diesel 
generator  is  exclusively  connected  to  a  single  Class  IE  4.16-kV 
load  group  and  has  no  automatic  connection  to the  redundant 
load  group.  
For  a  discussion  of  this  regulatory  guide,  with  respect  to  the 
Class  IE  dc  system,  refer  to  Section  8.3.2.2.1.  
No  provisions  exist  for  automatic  transfer  of  loads  between 
redundant  onsite  power  supplies.  
The  diesel  generator  of  one  load  group  cannot  be  automatically 
paralleled  with  the  diesel  generator  of  the  redundant  load 
group.  
Interlocks  are  provided  to  assure  that  a  single  operator  error 
would  not  parallel  the  standby  power  sources  of  redundant  load 
groups.  Refer  to  Section  8.3.1.1.3.  
REGULATORY  GUIDE  1.9,  SELECTION  OF  DIESEL  GENERATOR  SET  CAPACITY 
FOR  STANDBY  POWER  SUPPLIES  - The  continuous  rating  of  each 
diesel  generator  is  greater  than  the  sum  of  the  conservatively 
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8.1-4  11/01FSAt  4CJA 
CALLAWAY  - SP 
Principal  design criteria  for  these  assemblies  include  the 
following: 
a.  The  mechanical  design,  materials,  fabrication, 
examination,  and  testing  of  the  pressure-retaining 
boundary  of  the  electrical  penetration  assembly, 
excluding  optical  fibers,  electrical  conductors, 
feed-through  connectors,  insulation,  potting 
compounds,  and  gaskets,  are  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  ASME  Boiler  and  Pressure  Vessel 
Code,  Section  III,  Subsection  NE,  for  Class  MC 
compounds.  
b.  The  electrical  penetration  assembly  is  designed  to 
meet  all  the  electrical  requirements  for the  specified 
service  environment  without  dielectric  breakdown  or 
overheating.  
c.  The  electrical  penetration  assembly  is  designed  to 
have  a total  gas  leakage  rate through  its 
pressure-retaining  o  Kdary  clusive  of  the  aperture 
seal  not  greater  thaL  x 10-6/standard  (20 0C  at  one 
atmosphere  of  pressur  e  centimeters  per  second 
of  dry  helium  (or  equivalent  means  of  measurement)  at 
the  maximum  specified  containment  design  pressure.  
d.  A  leak  test  is  performed  on  each  penetration  assembly 
following  installation.  t is  capable  of 
detecting  a  leakage  rate  oI  ubic  centimeters  per 
second  or  less  of  dry nitro:  ith maximum 
containment  pressure  applied  across  the penetration 
assembly  pressure  barrier  seal  at  ambient  temperature.  
e.  Each  penetration  room  has  a  continuous  nitrogen  supply 
system  manifolded  to  each  penetration  assembly.  The 
design  and  installation  of  the  system  facilitates 
periodic  individual  penetration  assembly  gas  leak rate 
testing  after  installation.  
f.  The  electrical  penetration  assembly  design  is  such 
that  safety-related  channel  separation  is  maintained.  
g.  The  penetration  assembly  design  is  qualified  by 
testing  for  the  intended  service within  the  service 
and  DBE  environment.  
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is  sized  to  carry  its anticipated  load  continuously,  but  may  be  j•\ 
slightly  overloaded  under  certain  abnormal  conditions.  For 
additional  details  of  the  sizing  of  these  components,  refer  to 
Section  8.3.1.  
The  two  offsite  power  circuits  e  full  testable.  Since  they 
are  continuously  energized  and  they  are 
continuously  tested  by  their use.  When  one circuit  is 
shutdown,  relays,  meters,  ad  other  instruments  can  be  tested 
and  calibrated  a  reire  x8oJ  -4  o  re  c.'oJ ,er  t÷• 
CDT-lrol  and  instrumentation  power  for  these offsite  power 
circuits  is  provided  by  the  Non-Class  IE  dc  system.  A  dc  power 
source  from  separate  station batteries  is  provided  to  each 
offsite  power  circuit  for  control  and  relaying  purposes.  
From  the  above  considerations,  it  is  concluded  that  the 
installation,  sizing,  and  control  of  both  of  the  offsite  power 
circuits  are  designed  so  as  to  minimize  the  likelihood  of  their 
simultaneous  failure  under  operating  and  accident  conditions.  
For  additional  details  concerning  the  compliance  of  the offsite 
power  system with  General  Design  Criteria,  refer  to 
Section  3.1.  
The  instrumentation  associated  with  the  offsite  ac  power  system 
provides  sufficient  information  to  determine  the  system 
availability  at  any  time.  
Drawings  E--INB01_and E-.INB02) Single  Line  Meter  and  Relay 
Diagrams  for the  Safety-Relate-ed  4.16-kV  Busses  NB01  and  NB02 
show  the  surveillance  details  of  the  ESF  transformers  and  their 
associated  4.16-kV  busses.  Table  8.3-4  of  the  FSAR,  Failure 
Modes  and  Effects  Analysis,  shows  the  system  failure  modes  and 
the  method  of  such  failure  detection.  
Rev.  OL-10 
8.2-2  11/988
NOTES: 
1.FR  E.,00  0  Wits  0(0.  M00ms$  *0  00(59000 
0.  CATION000  DEX(00  E00105  0(0(  -1(0040010( 
(00*0  I"AAE22NS0I 10000G0  (.220000.  
S.  (0((0*AL  N?  (041"  0*A  00BE  SUBSTITUTED  (I 
8. 00 8*01  Y.  000010(1  100 
OK5O. 2L00 CA.TRP0.01ut0'2000C 
1.  4(001  8008(S*000(  0  15  0(10 
0.  0EA10S000.  001005  (0*M000.101  0  GROUP(0  .  
(0. I000W*R1A¶  UN*010000  AR)  000(0  PANIER*OF1A.  
10.  001.01.0.  
It.  DELET00.  
SEE5.0-5.  0(10002*00001000-00010010.100 
13. DELETE..000  00001001.101001  100 
0  40001.00*010I026  0  100
H 
C 
F
,1  p  I  1  ,  4r
009. 08*0 
10 000000600 
00 
509*4001000 
0000 8
'o0(10  FE2Rr,, 
ftm STS7
7 6
2Sr 
0  12001*0 
1010/5  ?0
RELA  1.8.*  000  000 
212."  000  029 
3d010 
]4  T000
￿i￿2  \￿/ 
15111
1.I  4.2K0112ft
0￿￿
100015
so$  W20
0  2000 0MW0020,
AS580
3
JO
A
052000420
5
000000  0000
To  NNE  ' 
0.2106  OCUMEIC 
NEW01
4.16KV. 2000A BUS,  350MVA  SWITCHGEAR
JO 
￿  0501400004
10015 20015
4100
I 
￿  1580000005 
00000 
5  *
100t
Er 
￿00
21 3
FR
__________________  I  ___  .. WE____  9_ 
50/5  (1010s0 
Ts  '  KW  11 
v.2A04100
000(15
l's  020
00015
A  A
0*0*10
V  V
BUS  N802
JO
I0/
￿000
40=0(0
9￿1￿0
(oF  OCE  000  (015V  LS  000.00011  0  0  0010s 
W-r00  000W0  ROMAT  MAI  GE  Pic 
FT  FEE  M9LP_  K_  a  I  CS  .M4 
(05r9i  01MOM000.00  0  a.,00a  01*000  1  2*41  Ac  0010 
El  -# tcAC  "-  MI-1 
Ul  0  I'3-  Af  PE-5M  _LY  1,  N  _ 
It  o  000(0  000  1  005000(0  10  00000 
It  _  _  _  _  __E  j  TU  CA  "  g.,  .6060 
66  12  IL= 5,200  040001  JL0C0A(051  W2E03It0 
515  OR00S000  40  OOOCOAOOI0010  .124  S-122011800
4.80(08
1(5  500(
*0*0 00.1001310050
0  10180CE  00  0.040  50-10"7011z"( 
CE  ".0  10-1003,S"51.  F 
55  0000000000  510010N50lye.10000  0(0  800-103-0*-00( 
00(0  000080000000  a.0  50.10045.t..0 
40  010011  40GE  A08*40  5*- 00012210 
9w  XIM11ý.M.ýEIR  DS3  .11  -1.1 
0*0  0(00001  00  t~I0  00  0*63  MR0 GE*.1 
044  *W8TEA0GE0  £040  5103131LM5 
*.s  *00(100  0c  8040  50.103I31t*00 
000  T0.  "*00(1(481  -010,0  1*00000  00  j'At00 
TAO  0005*000TAW40OIL  10LEVEL.(00  03.000
I  LIC2  1 1-  00-0(01  00l-
00040  0  (0000*0001 
50*. 00*0￿ 
000/0210 
jJ8￿
8 200/0004  '-p 
9011 
I
1000*10  04800 
00011200  000/0000 
CIKC
J.
301
so's 
'S38
902T  0004
Ii
)00  4
i  -i  I  4i  -i-  i  4  .4....-.i  I.
00(00  000
￿.1
450l1.  M 
'E(0  .(00100
000140080001 
504*1  *0000 
00(00(0
5w 
Ii.0000 
m0l044(.
ci7
AIIIIl'  E 
0*00.  20 
Ole01
A..  
(O(  10 
000 
00(900050  000.100 
001(09(000
02
0000040000  0000(06 
00*1010*0000 500*0
0000I  EMC 
.ATER(0.  (0(0 
MUM01
Al
0.0(06 
00 0*000  II 
00  1.00*  0651(0
AN
IL-
I  DI
TO 
WC WOE0
A
1060(piny(OF0000(0(0ouiat0( 
(5 050010  ?IS]  *10  0VOLT0GE1LEVEL 
3  25-1 
2  00.000 
.4(000
WIN74 M.  
"4" 
.FrMn.  i  I 
'1  4.  
s  c 
j  ,  1. .  
j 
1"j,  I&  Ism  Fm 
$S-iOMC 
AS  BUILT  CLASS  1
LOWR  EDIUM VOLTAGE SYSTEMO 
0/  LASS ME  "I  6KOV  SINýGLE  LINE  I  - 0/0~  MEIER  AND RELAY  DIAGRAM 
(0.1.041  1*5  UIONEETRCCUPNT 
ONIN  EECTIC  00.0*01 .n-i.12n.*n.   IT  *0.  Ul*.  M  I  - P-3?(a0
8  7  6  5  3  21
I
16
IAI
f;AtCA)e  -Ao;,-cOV 
FAJZ  Sdea.,~  S 
PW^%  12/2 0 /&,74IY~JOV4
0,8 
0.002 
(101 10  Os  s112  Ws
E
D
ýj
C
'W'
I015
B 
Al
I  I um-4-1-4
.........  --- -,  I  I
10 lw  a  Ica
i 
i I
i
T--T-YP-E-T  I  IwTc  3,1 -L  msm]PTIN
KO'S  10, 
-DI,
rV51 ý16  12
kGý ý-,  JMTE  10.
szoacu
[  I  I I
[
r--KV
ytiý
I
21 1m
I
I 
I
0,
I
1.11 ￿  ￿
2I  w  I  d  I  - I  a  I  I  2  I  g  I  -I--I  diS  I  d-1
saw.  
T.  .1 
- s  a; 
~m 
I  1; A
b,
*?; 
U' 
Sc
I 
-3
S 
S
S
T
I 
I
I1 t  I
111TII -F
I 
I 
I 
S 
I
C
2 
I
I.  
IS 
S 
B
A 
as  s 
￿s  S 
55
I.-FSAa  c4  o67.0o-o/ 
CALLAWAY  - S P  12  /T/2  0/o 
8.3  ONSITE  POWER  SYSTEMS 
The  onsite  power  system  is  comprised  of  a  standardized  portion 
within  the  power block  and  a  nonstandardized  portion  outside  of 
the  power  block.  The  electrical  power  systems  within  the  power 
block  and  Class  IE'nonstandard  site portions  are  described  in 
this  section.  The  non-Class  IE  electrical  power  systems 
outside  of  the  power  block  are  described  in  Section  8.3  of  the 
Site  Addendum.  
8.3.1  AC  POWER  SYSTEMS 
8.3.1.1  Description 
The  onsite  ac  power  system  includes  a  Class  IE  system  and  a 
non-Class  IE  system.  
8.3.1.1.1  Non-Class  IE  System 
The  non-Class  IE  ac  system  is  that  part  of  the  power  system 
outside  the  broken-line  enclosures  indicated  in  Figure  8.3-1.  
The  non-Class  IE  ac  system distributes  power  at  13.8  kV,  4.16 
kV,  480  V,  and  208/120  V  ac  for all nonsafety-related  loads.  
The  non-Class  IE  ac  system also  supplies  preferred  (offsite) 
power  to  the  Class  IE  ac  system  through  two  ESF  transformers.  
One  ESF  transformer  is  supplied  power  directly,  by  one  of  the 
preferred  power  circuits,  from  the  offsite  power  system.  The 
second  ESF  transformer  is  supplied  power  from  one  of the 
secondary  windings  of  the  startup  transformer.  This  startup 
transformer  is  supplied  power  from  the  second  preferred  ow 
circuit  from  the  offsite  power__system.  'out  0r  c a  s  from• 
The u  transuxiliry  to  t  Clasnd  •e•  geartup  shor  n  dr  ing  E  0R0  4  E  3321,  0OR3  and  -231  Ru 
of  1le  kfrom  te  sta  t  frm  ' the•  .8[k••_  _ 
E-0R  24.  beeds  to  ESF  tr~anis  e  ...  ...  p 
•ransformer  are  described  in  the  Site Addendum.  
The  unit  auxiliary  transformer  and  the  startup  transformer  each 
have  two  secondary  windings  rated at  13.8  kV.  
Two  13.8-kV  busses  supply  power  to nonsafety-related  loads.  
Each  13.8-kV  bus  is  connected  to  a  secondary  winding  of  the 
startup  transformer  and  also  to  a  secondary  winding  of  the  unit 
auxiliary  transformer.  During  starting  of  the unit,  both 
13.8-kV  busses  are  supplied  power  from  the  startup  transformer.  
The  busses  are  later transferred  to  the unit auxiliary 
transformer,  during  power  generation,  by  a  manually  initiated 
transfer.  Automatic  transfer  of  the  13.8-kV  busses  from the 
unit auxiliary  transformer  to  the  startup  transformer  is 
provided.  
8.3-1  Rev.  OL-0 
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The  transfer  functions  in  accordance  with  the  following 
criteria: 
a.  The  bus  transfer  is  performed  immediately  following 
electrical  faults  and  critical  turbine  trips  (trips 
immediately  hazardous  to  the  turbine)  in  the 
generation  system,  where  the  generator/network  can  no 
longer  supply  power  to  the  reactor  coolant  pumps.  
Critical  turbine  trips are  low  vacuum  and  thrust 
bearing  wear  (upper and  lower).  
b.  The  bus  transfer  is  delayed  30  seconds  following 
noncritical  turbine  generator  trips  not  involving 
electrical  faults.  The  turbine  generator  will  remain 
connected  to the  switchyard  during  the  delayed  period  {.¾ 
to  allow  the  switchyard  to  supply  power  to  the  reactor 
coolant  pump  busses  for  30  seconds  before  any  transfer 
is  made.  
The  unit  auxiliary  and  startup  transformer  has  the  capacity  to 
supply  both  non-Class  IE  and  both  Class  IE  load  groups 
simultaneously.  Refer  to  Section  8.1.2  for  a  definition  of 
load  group.  Figure  8.3-1  shows  the  transformers,  feeders, 
busses,  and  their  connections.  It  also  lists  all  loads 
directly  supplied  from  each  13.8-kV  and  4.16-kV  bus.  
Two  feeders  from  each  of  the  two  13.8-kV  busses  supply  power  to 
non-Class  IE  site  loads  located  outside  the  power  block.  The 
maximum  load per  bus  is  21.7  MVA.  Loads  and  power  distribution 
systems  are  described  in  detail  in  Section  8.3.1  of  the  Site 
Addendum.  
The  startup  transformer  is  equipped  with  two  secondary 
windings,  each  rated at  13.8  kV,  50  MVA  FOA.  
The  startup  transformer,  ESF  transformers,  and  their associated 
feeder  cables  have  all  been  sized  to  carry their  expected  loads 
continuously.  During  normal  system  operation,  transformer 
loads  are  below  the  manufacturer's  FOA  design  limitations.  
Under  abnormal  system  configurations,  such  as  when  an  ESF  or 
station  service  transformer  is  out  of  service,  loads  may  be 
transferred  to  the  alternate  startup  transformer  secondary 
winding.  Provisions  exist  for  the  automatic  transfer  of  busses 
PB03/PBO4  and  for  manual  transfer  of  busses  NBO1/NBO2  to  their 
alternate  source.  Under  these  conditions,  additional  loads  may 
be  placed  on  a  startup  transformer  secondary  winding.  The 
secondary  winding  that  supplies  power  to  13.8  kV  bus  PA02  and 
ESF  transformer  XNB02  has  been  selected  for  a  load  analysis.  
Analyses  have  been  performed  to  evaluate  the  maximum  bus  and 
transformer  loadings  that  may  result  from  these  transformer 
failures.  Under  conditions  whereby  a  station  service  transformer 
has  failed prior  to an  accident,  the  startup  transformer 
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winding  supplying  XNB02  may  be  loaded  to  56.5  MVA,  or  113  percent 
of  its  FOA  rating.  Under  conditions  whereby  an  ESF  transformer 
has  failed  prior  to  an  accident,  the  same  winding  may  be  loaded 
to  54.3  MVA,  or  108  percent  of  its  FOA  rating.  Under  conditions 
whereby  both  a  station  service  and  an  ESF  transformer  have  failed 
prior  to  an  accident,  the  subject  startup  transformer  winding  may 
be  loaded  to  63  MVA,  or  126  percent  of  its  FOA  rating.  These 
loads  represent  the  maximum  credible  loads  that  may  be  achieved 
during  abnormal  system  operation.  
Using  the  guidelines  of  ANSI  C57.92-1962,  operation  of 
oil-immersed  power  transformers  in  an  overloaded  condition  is 
permissible.  Measurable  loss  of  transformer  life  occurs  if  the 
overload  is  allowed  to  persist  for  extended  periods  of  time.  
For  the  overload  conditions  described  above,  the  startup 
transformer  may  suffer  a  .5  percent,  .25  percent,  and  2  percent 
loss  of  life,  respectively  if  the  overloads  are  allowed  to 
persist  for  8  hours.  This  is  based  on  an  ambient  temperature 
of  40 0C  and  the  conservative  assumption  that  the  startup 
transformer  is  loaded  to  50  percent  of  its  FOA  rating  prior  to 
the  overload.  
The  protective  relays  associated  with  the  startup  transformer 
are  set  above  these  maximum  overload  values.  
The  continuous  ampacity  of  the  feeder  cables  from  the  startup 
transformer  to the  13.8  kV  switchgear  PA02  and  ESF  transformer 
XNB02  is  not  exceeded  under  any  loading  condition  described 
above.  
Each  offsite  power  source  (Engineered  Safety  Features 
transformers  XNB01  and  XNB02)  is  provided  with  a  separate 
capacitor  bank.  They  do  not  share  any  common  electrical  or 
control  circuits  and  they  cannot  be  paralleled  even  if  the 
Class  1E 4.16kV  Busses  NB01  and  NB02  are  cross  connected.  
Therefore,  the  probability  that  simultaneous  failures  of  both 
capacitor  banks  will  cause  both  offsite  sources  to  become 
inoperable  is  negligible.  Each  capacitor  bank  has  the  capacity 
to  raise  the  voltage  at  its  respective  NB  bus  by  reducing  the 
inductive  losses  in  the  system.  
Capacitor  banks  NB03  and  NB04  are  non-safety  related  and  are 
connected  to  the  non-safety  related  transformers  using  manual 
full  load  break  switches.  Capacitor  bank  NB03  is  associated 
with  train  "A"  equipment.  Capacitor  bank  NB04  is  associated 
with  train  "B"  equipment.  
Full  load  break  switches  NB0301  and  NB0401  provide  a  means  of 
disconnecting  the  capacitor  banks  from  the transformers  for 
equipment  maintenance.  Each  capacitor  bank  is  interlocked  with 
its  respective  Emergency  Diesel  Generator  to  "freeze"  automatic 
actions  and  thereby  prevent  system  interactions  during 
Emergency  Diesel  Generator  testing.  Each  capacitor  bank 
receives  an  interlock  signal  from  its  respective  LOCA  sequencer 
to  prevent  excessive  capacitor  cycling  during  sequencer 
operation.  
8.3-3  Rev.  OL-12 
11/01CALLAWAY  - SP  ,A  M 
FS A  1ZO  0 0 -'00  j~
0 yD-.~L 
Control  Room  annunciation  is  provided  to  indicate  system 
trouble,  lockout  relay  trips,  and  manual  control  switches  out 
of  position.  The  Diesel  Generator  "freeze"  interlock  is 
annunciated  in  the  Control  Room  to  confirm  proper  system 
interface.  
Two  over  voltage  protection  relays  are  installed  in  each 
capacitor  bank  control  section  to  protect  against  NB  bus  over 
voltages  caused  by  inadvertent  actuation  of  the  capacitor 
banks.  
The  credible  failure  mechanisms  of  the  Capacitor  Banks  that 
have  the  worst-case  potential  effect  on  Class  1E equipment  can 
be  categorized  into three  distinct  cases.  Case  1  is  the 
failure  of  the  capacitor  banks  to turn  on,  Case  2  is  the 
failure  of  the  capacitor  banks  to turn  off,  and  Case  3  is  a 
failure  in  the  capacitor  bank  that  causes  the  feeder  breaker  to 
the  associated  13.8  kV  to  4.16  kV  transformer  to trip.  A 
failure  modes  and  effects  analysis  was  performed  and 
appropriate  portions  are  included  in  Table  8.3-4.  
The  review  of  the  failure  cases  listed  above  confirms  that 
expected  system  responses  are  enveloped  by  the  existing 
accident  analysis.  Case  2  bus  high  voltage,  is  an  analyzed  and 
accepted  failure  case.  
This  small  voltage  increase  may  cause  a  slight  increase  in  the 
thermal  aging  of  any  energized  electric  equipment.  In  order  to 
prevent  the  aging,  two  specific  design  features  have  been 
included.  The  first  design  feature  consists  of  over  voltage 
Control  Room  annunciators  to  NG  busses  NG01,  NG02,  NG03,  NG04, 
NG07,  and  NG08.  The  second  design  feature  consists  of  over 
voltage  protection  relays  in  each  of  the  capacitor  banks  to 
shut  the  capacitors  off  if  an  over  voltage  condition  is 
etected.  
8.3.1.1.2  Class  IE  AC  System 
The  Class  IE  ac  system  is  that  portion  of  the  onsite  power 
system  inside  the  broken-line  enclosures  shown  in  Figure  8.3-1.  
The  Class  IE  ac  system  distributes  power  at  4.16  kV,  480  V, 
208/120  V,  and  120  V  ac  to  all  safety-related  loads.  Also,  the 
Class  IE  ac  system  supplies  certain  selected  loads  which  are 
not  safety  related  but  are  important  to  the  plant  operation.  
Figure  8.3-2  lists  the  major  safety-related  and  isolated 
nonsafety-related  loads  supplied  from  the  Class  IE  ac  system.  
In  addition  to  the  above  power  distribution,  the  Class  IE  ac 
system  contains  standby  power  sources  which  provide  the  power 
required  for  safe  shutdown  in  the  event  of  a  loss  of  the 
preferred  power  sources.  
The  following  describes  various  features  of  the  Class  IE 
systems: 
POWER  SUPPLY  FEEDERS  - Each  4.16-kV  load  group  is  supplied  by 
two  preferred  power  supply  feeders  and  one  diesel  generator 
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The  ESF  transformers  are  equipped  with  automatic  on-load  tap 
changers.  The  automatic  load  tap  changers  are  capable  of 
varying  the  voltage  at  the  respective  NB  bus  by  ±16%  (1%  per 
step  with  32  steps),  the  equivalent  of  approximately  ±  665 
Volts  at  the  4160  Volt  level.  The  load  tap  changer  range  is 
limited  by  a  gear  driven  limit  switch  limiting  the  voltage 
extremes  created  by  the  transformers.  
The  LTC  transformers  do  not  share  any  common  electrical  or 
control  circuits  and  they  cannot  be  paralleled  even  if  the 
Class  1E  4.16kV  Busses  NB01  and  NB02  are  cross  connected.  
Therefore,  the  probability  that  simultaneous  failures  of 
both  transformers  to  cause  both  offsite  sources  to  become 
inoperable  is  negligible.  
The  failure  of  one  transformer  will  have  no  effect  on  the 
operability  of  the  other  transformer  or  Class  1E equipment 
train.  The  credible  failure  mechanisms  of  the  transformers 
that  will  have  the  worst-case  effects  on  the  associated 
Class  1E equipment  are  summarized  on  Table  8.3-4.  
The  control  circuits,  like  the  capacitor  bank  control 
circuits,  are  interlocked  with  its  respective  Emergency 
Diesel  Generator  to  "freeze"  automatic  actions  and  thereby 
prevent  adverse  system  interactions  during  Emergency  Diesel 
Generator  testing.  A  Diesel  Generator  "freeze"  interlock 
signal  annunciator  in  the  Control  Room  to  confirms  proper 
tap  changer  system  interface.  
In  addition,  Control  Room  annunciators  are  provided  to 
indicate  if  the  load  tap  changers  or  capacitor  bank  control 
circuits  are  not  in  automatic.  Automatic  control  is  needed 
to  obtain  the  voltage  control  from  these  components.  
Control  Room  annunciator  provide  indication  of  system 
trouble.  A  multi-point  annunciator  is  provided  at  each 
transformer  to  allow  the  quick  determination  of  the  cause  of 
the  trouble  signal.  
With  both  systems  (load  tap  changers  and  capacitor  banks)  in 
operation,  the  general  response  to  a  voltage  decrease  is  for 
the  capacitor  bank  to  provide  a  rapid  voltage  increase  if 
needed,  then  the  LTC  will  step  to  correct  the  voltage  back 
to  a  4.16  kV  level  and  thus  turn  the  capacitor  bank  off.  
The  voltage  control  systems  function  to  ensure  that  the 
voltage  at  NB01  and  NB02  is  sufficient  to  reset  the  safety 
related  degraded  voltage  relays  and  loss  of  voltage  relays 
before  time  limits  are  exceeded.  With  this,  the  preferred 
off  site  power  sources  are  retained  to  power  the  safety 
related  electrical  distribution  system.  The  voltage  control 
systems  also  function  to  ensure  that  overvoltages  are  not 
present  in  the  safety  related  electrical  distribution  system 
when  fed  from  the  preferred  power  sources.CALLAWAY  - SP  u  /2-/2  auiio) 
(standby)  supply  feeder.  Each  4.16-kV  bus  supplies  motor  loads 
and  4.0-kV/480-V  load center  transformers  with their  associated 
480-V  busses.  
BUS  ARRANGEMENTS  - The  Class  IE  ac  system  is  divided  into  two 
redundant  load  groups  per  unit  (load  groups  1  and  2).  For  each 
unit,  either  one  of  the  load  groups  is  capable  of providing 
power  to  safely  reach  cold  shutdown  for  that unit.  Each  ac 
load  group  consists  of  a  4.16-kV  bus,  480-V  load  centers,  480-V 
motor  control  centers,  and  lower  voltage  ac  supplies.  
LOADS  SUPPLIED  FROM  EACH  BUS  - Refer  to  Figure  8.3-2  for  a 
listing of  Class  IE  system  loads  and  their  respective  busses.  
MANUAL  AND  AUTOMATIC  INTERCONNECTIONS  BETWEEN  BUSSES,  BUSSES 
AND  LOADS,  AND  BUSSES  AND  SUPPLIES  - No  provisions  exist  for 
automatically  connecting  one  Class  IE  load  group  to  another 
redundant  Class  IE  load  group  or  for  automatically  transferring 
loads  between  load  groups.  The  incoming  preferred  power  supply 
associated  with  a  load  group  can  supply  the  4.16-kV  Class  IE 
bus  of the  other  load  group  by  manual  operation  of  the  requisite 
4.16-kV  circuit breakers  when  required.  
Interlocks  are  provided  that would  prevent  an  operator  error 
that would parallel  the  standby  power  sources  of  redundant  load 
groups.  
For  a  further  discussion  of  interlocks,  refer to  Section 
8.3.1.1.3.  
INTERCONNECTIONS  BETWEEN  SAFETY-RELATED  AND  NONSAFETY-RELATED 
BUSSES.-  No  interconnections  are  provided  between  the  safety
and  nonsafety-related  busses.  The  startup  transformer  supplies 
power  through  the  same  winding  to  a  13.8-kV  bus  and  a  13.8/4.16-kV 
ESF  transformer.  
REDUNDANT  BUS  SEPARATION  - The  Class  IE  switchgear,  load 
centers,  and  motor  control  centers  for  the  redundant  load 
groups  are  located  in  separate  rooms  of the  control  building 
and  auxiliary  building  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  physical 
separation.  Refer  to  Section  8.3.1.4.1  and  Section  8.3.1.1.7 
for  the  criteria  governing  redundant  bus  separation.  
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a.  4.16-kV  Switchgear
Bus 
Incoming  breakers 
Feeder  breakers 
MVA  interrupting
2000A  continuous  rating 
2000A  continuous,  350 
MVA  interrupting 
1200A  continuous,  350
b.  480-V  Unit  Load  Centers
Transformers 
Bus 
Incoming  breakers 
Feeder  breakers
1000  kVA,  3  phase,  60-Hz, 
4000/480  V 
1600A  continuous 
1600A  continuous,  50,OOOA rms 
symmetrical  interrupting 
800A  continuous,  30,OOOA rms 
symmetrical  interrupting  (with 
instantaneous  trip) 
25,OOOA rms  symmetrical 
interrupting  (without 
instantaneous  trip)
c.  480-V  Motor  Control  Centers
Horizontal  bus 
Vertical  bus 
Breakers  (molded 
case)
600A  continuous,  25,OOOA rms 
symmetrical 
300A  continuous,  25,OOOA rms 
symmetrical 
25,OOOA rms  symmetrical, 
minimum  interrupting 
(singly  for  thermal-magnetic 
breakers  and  in  combination 
with  a  starter  for  magnetic 
only  breakers)
AUTOMATIC  LOADING  AND  LOAD  SHEDDING  - The  automatic  loading 
sequence  of  the  Class  IE  busses  is  indicated  in  Figure  8.3-2.  
If  preferred  power  is  available  to the  4.16-kV  Class  IE  bus 
following  a  LOCA,  the  Class  IE  loads  will  be  started  in 
programmed  time  increments  by  the  load  sequencer.  The 
sequencer  provides  an  interlock  signal  to  the  capacitor  banks 
to  assure  proper  system  operation  and  coordination.  The 
emergency  standby  diesel  generator  will  be  automatically 
started  but  not  connected  to the  bus.  However,  in  the  event 
that preferred  power  is  lost  following  a  LOCA,  the  load 
sequencer  will  function  to  shed  selected  loads  and 
automatically  start the  associated  standby  diesel  generator 
(connection  of  the  standby  diesel  generator  to  the  4.16-kV 
Class  IE  bus  is  performed  by  the  diesel  generator  control 
circuitry).  Load  sequencers  will  then  function  to start  the) 
required  Class  IE  loads  in  programmed  time  increments.  
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B.  FAILURE MODES AND  EFFECTS ANALYSIS
IFSA/L  CA)  ~ea 
.r ~  LL40V#
fz5Ai  LV  CNOe7-  o 
W"*-  12112/0141V
Equip. No.  Equip. Name 
N/A  Offsite power 
N/A  Offsite power 
XMRO1  Startup 
transformer
Function 
Provides power to 
startup xfmr XMRO 1 
Provides power to 
ESF xfmr XNBO1 
Provides preferred 
power to ESF xfmr 
XNB02
Failure Mode 
Loss of power 
Loss of power 
Fails to provide 
power
Effect on 
Subsystem 
Loss of preferred 
power to xfmr 
XMR01 
Loss of preferred 
power to XNBO1 
Loss of preferred 
power to XNB02
Method 
of Failure 
Detection 
Undervoltage 
relays, volt-meters, 
lights or 
undervoltage 
annunciation.  
Undervoltage 
relays, volt meters, 
lights or 
undervoltage 
annunciation 
Overcurrent, neutral 
ground overcurrent, 
and differential 
relays, fault 
pressure 
annunciation; 
undervoltage 
annunciation for 
bus NB02.
Effect on 
Total System 
None-offsite power 
supplied by alternate 
source through ESF 
xfmr XNBO1 
None-offsite power 
supplied by alternate 
source through 
startup xfmr XMR0 1 
None-offsite power 
supplied by alternate 
source through ESF 
xfmr XNBO1
Causes of 
Failure 
Offsite system failure, 
transmission line 
failure, bus fault, 
failure of swyd C.B.  
Low grid voltage.  
Offsite system failure, 
transmission line 
failure, bus fault, 
failure of swyd C.B.  
Low grid voltage.  
Internal fault, 
lightning arrestor 
failure, bushing 
failure, cooling system 
failure (during startup 
only)
XNBO1  ESF transformer  Provides preferred  Fails to provide  Loss of preferred  Undervoltage  None-D-G  NEO I  Internal fault, bushing 
power to bus NBO 1  power  power to bus NBO I  annunciation on bus  energizes NBO 1 until  failure 
and backup power to  and backup power  NBO0  bkr  152NBO109 is 
bus NB.2  to bus NB02  manually closed 
S•-z"r  1,3-  (  Periodic testing and 
NB03  XNBO 1  voltage  Provides voltage  Fails to provide  Loss of preferred  UV annunciation on  None D-G NEO 1  Internal fault, Internal 
support capacitor  support for the NBO 1  voltage support to  power to bus NBO 1  bus NBO 1  . energizes NBO I until  part failure, Loss of 
bank  Class  1E bus  NBO1  and backup power  Periodic testing and  bkr 152NB0109  is  control power.  
to bus NB02  inspection  manually closed.  
Control system  Slight overvoltage  Overvoltage  None, short duration  Capacitor bank PLC 
fails, provides  annunciation on NG  overvoltage  failure.  
excessive voltage  load centers  operation is 
to NBO1  evaluated 
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Equip. Name  Function Method 
of failure 
detection
Effect on 
Total System
INSERT 8.3-4 (1)
ESF Transformer 
XNBO0  automatic 
load tap changer 
(LTC)
Provides voltage 
support for ESF 
busses
Controllers fail 
low
Raises NB 
bus voltage 
unexpectedly
Overvoltage 
Annunciation 
from NG load 
centers.
None. Capacitor banks 
will not interact.  
Short term 
overvoltage has 
been evaluated.  
Limit device prevents 
extreme voltage changes.  
XNB02 offsite power 
available.
Lowers NB 
bus voltage 
unexpectedly
NB bus voltage 
remains as is 
without LTC 
control
Undervoltage  None. Capacitor Banks 
annunciation  step on.  Eventually 
degraded voltage 
circuits shed bus.  
Loads are transferred 
to Diesel Generators.  
XNBO2 offsite power 
available.
LTC controller 
self check causes 
MCB LTC 
trouble 
annunciation.  
Over/Under 
Voltage 
annunciation
None. Voltage will 
not be adjusted.  Can 
result in overvoltage  or 
undervoltage  depending 
on offsite voltage.  
Undervoltage  may 
result in load shed.  
Loads are transferred 
to Diesel generator 
Overvoltage  is evaluated.  
XNB02 offsite power 
available.
Primary and 
back-up 
controllers fail 
high.  
LTC controller 
potential 
transformers 
fail high 
Controller lock-up 
LTC motor failure 
LTC potential 
transformers  fail 
low.  
Voltage sensing 
transformer fuses 
fail.
Equip. No. Failure Mode Effect on 
Subsystem
Cause of 
Failure
Primary  and 
back-up 
controllers 
fail low.
Control fails 
high
Tap changer 
fails to moveCALLAWAY  - SP 
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Equip. Name 
ESF transformer
Function 
Provides preferred 
power to bus NB02 
and backup power to 
hits NRO01
Failure Mode 
Fails to provide 
power
Effect on 
Subsystem 
Loss of preferred 
power to bus NB02 
and backup power to 
bus N-B01
"f-4e  aC/o-oS0'-
Method 
of Failuro 
Detection
Undervoltage 
annunciation on bus 
NB02
FSA,  eA)  00  oo-oo8  cS.",or.  
Effect on  C 
n  Total System
None-D-G NE02 
energized NB02 until 
bkr 152NB0212 is 
manually closed
Luses of 
ailure
Internal  fault, bushing 
failure
-aj,  r  f.  0-569,-  Periodic testing and  •  •  ----  -,,-  ~ins  ctio  ...-  -..
NB04  XNB02  voltage  Provides voltage  Fails to provide  Loss of preferred  UV annunciation on  None D-G NEQI  Internal  fault, Internal 
support capacitor  support for the NB02  voltage support to  power to bus NB02  bus NB02.  Periodic  energizes NBOI  until  part failure, Loss of 
bank  Class I  E bus  NB02  and backup power to  testing and inspection  bkr 152NB0212 is  control power.  
bus NBOI  manually closed.
Control system 
fails, provides 
excessive  voltage to 
NBO2
252PA0201  1,200-A 13.8-kV 
N.C.  incoming feeder 
bkr
152NB0209  2,000-A, 4.16-kV 
N.C. breaker
152NB0109  2,000-A, 4.16-kV 
N.O. breaker
Provides  power to and 
protects ESF xfinr 
XNB02
Provides preferred 
power to and protects 
bus NB02
Provides backup power 
to and protects bus 
NBOI
Fails open
Fails closed 
Fails open
Fails closed
Fails open
Fails closed
Slight overvoltage
Loss of preferred 
power to xfmr 
XNB02 
Swyd bkr isolates 
xfmr XMRO1 
Loss of preferred 
power to bus NB02 
Bus NB02 isolated 
by N.C. bkr 
252PA0201 
Loss of backup 
power to bus NBO I 
Bus NBOI  isolated 
by N.C. bkr 
252PA0201
Overvoltage 
annunciation on NG 
load centers 
Indicating lights, 
undervoltage 
annunciation on bus 
NB02 
Periodic  testing and 
inspection 
Indicating  lights, 
undervoltage 
annunciation on bus 
NB02 
Periodic testing and 
inspection 
Indicating  lights, 
undervoltage 
annunciation  on bus 
NBOI 
Periodic testing and 
inspection
None, short duration 
overvoltage  operation 
is evaluated 
None-D-G NE02 feeds 
bus NB02 until bkr 
152NB0212 is closed 
None-D-G NE02 feeds 
bus NB02 until bkr 
152NB0212 is closed.  
Non-bus NB02 
supplied by NE02 
None-bus NB02 
isolated by N.C. bkr 
252PA0201; ESF loads 
fed by L.G.1 
None-backup power to 
bus NBOI  supplied by 
D-G NEOI 
None-ESF loads fed by 
L.G.2
Capacitor bank PLC 
failure.  
Mechanical failure, relay 
failure, control power 
failure
Mechanical  failure, relay 
failure, loss of control 
power
Mechanical failure,  relay 
failure,  loss of control 
power
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Equip. Name  Function Method 
of failure 
detection
Effect on 
Total System
ESF Transformer 
XNB02 automatic 
load tap changer 
(LTC)
Provides voltage 
support for ESF 
busses
Controllers fail 
low
INSERT 8.3-4(2) 
Raises NB 
bus voltage 
unexpectedly
Overvoltage 
Annunciation 
from NG load 
centers.
None. Capacitor banks 
will not interact.  
Short term 
overvoltage has 
been evaluated.  
Limit device prevents 
extreme voltage changes.  
XNBO1  offsite power 
available.
Lowers NB 
bus voltage 
unexpectedly
NB bus voltage 
remains as is 
without LTC 
control
Undervoltage  None. Capacitor Banks 
annunciation  step on.  Eventually 
degraded voltage 
circuits shed bus.  
Loads are transferred 
to Diesel Generators.  
XNBO1  offsite power 
available.
LTC controller 
self check causes 
MCB LTC 
trouble 
annunciation.  
Over/Under 
Voltage 
annunciation
None. Voltage will 
not be adjusted.  Can 
result in overvoltage  or 
undervoltage  depending 
on offsite voltage.  
Undervoltage  may 
result in load shed.  
Loads are transferred 
to Diesel generator 
Overvoltage  is evaluated.  
XNBO1  offsite power 
available.
Primary and 
back-up 
controllers fail 
high.  
LTC controller 
potential 
transformers 
fail high 
Controller lock-up 
LTC motor failure 
LTC potential 
transformers fail 
low.  
Voltage sensing 
transformer fuses 
fail.
Equip. No. Failure Mode Effect on 
Subsystem
Cause of 
Failure
Primary  and 
back-up 
controllers 
fail low.
Control fails 
high
Tap changer 
fails to moveM$RjHV-mill 
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c.  Following  a  fire,  the  fire dampers  are  accessible  only  6 
from that  area  where  they  are  located.  Major  other 
systems  and  components  would  be  remotely  operable  from 
the  control  room.  
d.  All  exhaust  fans,  with  the  exception  of  the  control 
building  fans,  are  centrifugal  with  the  motor  located 
outside  of  the  airstream,  making  them  less  susceptible 
to high  gas  temperatures.  The  fans  are  capable  of 
processing  air of  temperatures  at least  as  high  as  the 
fusible  link melting  temperature  (160 0F/1650 F)  of  the 
fire  dampers.  The  control  building  exhaust  fans  are 
vaneaxial  with  the  motors  located  in  the  process 
airstream.  The  fan  motor  is  designed  for  a  minimum 
1500F.  temperature  rise.  
Since  the  exhaust  fans  are  all downstream  of  the 
system  filter  units,  they will  not  be  subject  to 
damage  from  high  temperature  particles.  
9.5.1.2.2.5  Other  Fire Protection  Features 
EMERGENCY  LIGHTING  - Section  9.5.3  describes  the  emergency 
lighting  system  and  the  design  features  provided  for post  fire 
access  and  egress.  Table  9.5.3-1  provides  a  listing  of  rooms 
in  which  operator  actions  are  required  for  safe  shutdown 
following  control  room  evacuation.  .  
RADIO  COMMUNICATION  - A  portable  radio  annunciation  system  will 
be  provided  which  may  be  used  by  the  fire brigade  and  other 
operations  personnel  involved  in  safe  plant  shutdown.  
FIRE  RESISTANT  AND  NONCOMBUSTIBLE  MATERIALS  - Construction 
materials  are  noncombustible  to  the  maximum  extent  practical.  
Noncombustible  materials  are  those  which  have  a  maximum  rating 
of  25  for  smoke  contribution,  fuel  contribution,  and  flame 
spread.  Insulation  over  metal  roof  decking  and  the  vapor 
barrier will  be  securely  attached  by  approved  noncombustible 
adhesive  and  perimeter  fastening.  
Suspended  acoustical  ceilings  and  their  supports  are  of  UL 
listed,  noncombustible  construction.  Insulation  for  pipes  and 
ducts  and  their  adhesives  are  noncombustible  and  UL  listed, 
where  practical.  Concealed  spaces  are  devoid  of  combustibles, 
as practical.  Materials  which  give  off  toxic  fumes  when 
exposed  to  fire  are  prohibited.  Excluding  charcoal  adsorbers, 
all ventilation  prefilters  for  filtration units  are  UL  Class  1.  
COMBUSTIBLE  OIL  - Areas  in  which  combustible  oil-filled 
equipment  is  located  are  prepared  to  eliminate  the  spread  of 
the  combustible  oil  from  the  immediate  area  of  the  equipment.  
An  enclosed  gravel  filled pit  is  located  beneath  the yard 
transformers.  The  pit  is  sized  to  contain  oil  from  the  largest 
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transformer  served  by  the  pitjeied-te water  from  two 
transformer  water  spray  systemis  operating  for  10 minutes 
.,  (unless  the pit  serves  only  one  transformer).  All  transformers 
inside  the building  are  the  dry  type.  A  fire barrier  of  at 
least  2-hour  rating  is  provided  between  all  oil-filled 
transformers  which  are  separated  by  less  than  50  feet  (except 
between  the  station  service  and  start-up  transformers  which  are 
within  40  feet  of  each  other  without  requiring  a  wall).  
The  underground  diesel  fuel  storage  tanks  are  set  on  a  firm 
foundation,  backfilled  with  noncorrosive  sand  surrounding  the 
tank  (6  inches  minimum)  and provided  with  a  covering  of  2  feet 
(minimum)  of  earth.  
Each  diesel  fuel  oil  day  tank  is  provided  with protection 
features  to  preclude  the  uncontrolled  leakage  of  diesel  fuel.  
The  design  features  provided  for  the  day  tank  were  reviewed  and 
accepted  by  the  NRC  at  the  Wolf  Creek  Fire  Protection  Audit  of 
February  6  to  9,  1984.  This  audit  was  also  applicable  to  the 
Callaway  Plant.  
An  oil  collection  system  to  collect  and  contain  the  lubricating 
oil  for  each  reactor  coolant  pump  is  installed.  Two  300-gallon 
lube  oil  collection  tanks  are  installed.  One  tank  serves  to 
collect  lube  oil  from  either  of  two  pumps.  The  tanks  will  be 
manually  drained  as  required.  The  hydrogen  bulk  supply 
manifold  is  located  out  of  doors,  at  an  unexposed  location.  
ION  EXCHANGE  RESINS  - To  ignite  and  to  sustain  combustion  is 
relatively  difficult  in  ion  exchange  resins  that  are  in  a 
hydrated  form  (as  opposed  to  those  in  dehydrated  form).  
The  ion  exchange  resins  are  received  and  stored  in  a  hydrated 
form  in  nonsafety-related  areas  of  the  plant  (radwaste  and 
turbine  buildings)  which  are  separated  from  the  safety-related 
areas  by  3-hour  fire  barriers.  The  only  safety-related  area  of 
the  plant  which  normally  contains  resins  is  Fire  Area  A-8  at 
elevation  2000  in  the  auxiliary  building.  All  of  the  resin, 
however,  is  contained  in  ASME  pressure  vessels  filled with 
water.  Spent  resin  is  sluiced  in  a  closed  pipe  to the  spent 
resin  storage  tank  in  the  radwaste  building.  Fresh  resins, 
still  the  hydrated  form,  will  be  introduced  into  the  resin 
filler  hopper  in  Room  1307  above  the  ion  exchange  vessels  from 
elevation  2026  of  the  auxiliary  building  Room  1405.  The  ion 
exchange  vessels  are  then  filled  from  the  resin  filler  hopper.  
Administrative  controls  will  ensure  that  Room  1405  is  separated 
from  adjacent  areas  by  a  3-hour-rated  fire barrier,  and 
automatic  smoke  detection  is  provided  at  the  ceiling  of  the 
room.  This  zone  is  within  75  feet  of  the  hose  stations  in  the 
corridor  (Room  1408  - see  Figure  9.5.1-2,  Sheet  3).  Portable 
extinguishers  are  installed outside  the  room  in  the  corridor.  
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8.2.1.2  Plant  site  Switchyard  and  Connections  to 
Onsgite  Dnistributjon  System 
The  345-kV  Callaway  Switchyard  consists  of  circuit  breakers, 
disconnect  switches,  buses,  transformers,  and  associated  equipment.  
The  switchyard  is  arranged  in  a  modified  breaker-and-a-half 
configuration  with  the Montgomery-Callaway-
7  line  connected  as  a 
radial  circuit  on  Bus  B  as  shown  in  Figure  8.2-5.  
A  345/13.8-kV  Safeguard  Transformer  is  connected  directly  to  each 
345-kV  bus  through  a  disconnect  switch  which  is  capable  of 
interrupting  magnetizing  current.  Safeguard  Transformer  A  is  a 
three-winding  transformer  rated  60/80/100-MVA  which  is  identical  to 
the  Startup  Transformer  and  can  be  used  to  replace  it  if  necessary.  
Safeguard  Transformer  B  is  a  two-winding  transformer  rated  30-MVA.  
Each  transformer  has  two  low  side  breakers  connected  so  that  either 
transformer  may  supply  via  underground  duct  a  13.8/4.16-kV 
Engineered  Safety  Feature  (ESF)  Transformer  at  the  plant.  The 
Safeguard  Transformers  are  sized  so  that  either  Transformer  A  or  B 
has  the  capacity  to  handle  the  design  shutdown  or  the  design  basis 
LOCA  load.  The  13.8-kV  breakers  are  electrically  interlocked  so 
that  the  low  side  windings  of  the  Safeguard  Transformers  cannot  be 
connected  together.  
Another  offsite  supply  consists  of  a  345-kV  overhead  circuit  from 
the  switchyard  to the  Start-up  Transformer.  The  capacity  of  the 
345-kV  circuit  to the  Start-up  Transformer  is  more  than  adequate  to 
supply  the  total  connected  loads  on  the  Start-up  Transformer.  A 
tap  off  of  one  of  the  secondaries  of  this Start-up  Transformer 
supplies the  second  ESF  Transformer.  The  two  ESF  transformers  with 
their  associated  capacitor  banks  and  supply  circuits  from  the 
345-kV  switchyard  provide  two  independent  sources  of  offsite  power 
for  the  Class  1E bus  *;ýj  •/•  c  C÷A-bt€'.  
Each  ESF  Transformer  is  rated  12/16-MVA  and  has  adequate  capacity 
to  supply  the  maximum  loads  of  both  safety-related  systems 
simultaneously  during  normal  and  abnormal  operating  conditions, 
accident  conditions  or  plant  shutdown  conditions.  Their  associated 
capacitor  banks  provide  voltage  correction  for  the  NB  busses  if 
required.  
The  13.8  kV  cables  to the  ESF  Transformers  are  designed  for  16MVA 
at  95% voltage.  The  secondary  cables  are  sized  for  8MVA  per  4  kV 
Class  1E Bus  at  95% voltage.  The  ampacity  and  group  derating 
factors  of  the  cables  are  in  accordance  with  the  manufacturer's 
recommendations  and  IPCEA  publication  P46-426  for  cables  in  duct 
banks  and  maintained  spaced  trays.  The  cable  ampacities  are  based 
on  a  maximum  conductor  temperature  of  90  degrees  C,  100 percent 
load  factor  and  all cables  fully  loaded.  
The  second  feeder  from  the  Safeguard  Transformer  will  be  used  to 
serve  site facilities  such  as  the  water  intake,  demineralizer, 
service  building,  stores  building,  345-kV  switchyard  station 
service,  etc.,  as  described  in  Section  8.3  and  shown  in  Figure 
8.3-1.  
The  physical  arrangement  of  the  345-kV  switchyard  will  be  as  shown  in 
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B 3.8  ELECTRICAL  POWER SYSTEMS  A 
B 3.8.1  AC Sources - Operating 
BASES 
BACKGROUND  The unit Class 1  E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources 
consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and 
alternate), and the onsite standby power sources (Train A and Train B 
diesel generators (DGs)).  As required by  10 CFR50, AppendixA, 
GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical  power system  provides 
independence  and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to 
the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.  
The onsite Class 1  E AC Distribution System is divided  into redundant 
load groups (trains) so that the loss of any one group does not prevent 
the minimum safety functions from being performed.  Each train has 
connections to two preferred offsite power sources and a single DG.  
Offsite power is supplied to the unit switchyard from the transmission 
network by three transmission lines.  From the switchyard, two electrically 
and physically separated circuits  provide AC power, through ESF 
transformers, to the 4.16 kV ESF buses.  A detailed description of the 
offsite power network and the circuits to the Class I E ESF buses is found 
in the  FSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2).  a__---_.....  _-
An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers  switches, 
interrupting devices,  cabling, and controls required to tI  power from 
the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1  E ESF buses.  
Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined 
sequence in order to prevent overloading the transformer supplying  offsite 
power to the onsite Class I E Distribution System.  Within 1 minute after 
the initiating signal is received,  all automatic and permanently connected 
loads needed to recover the-unit or maintain it in a safe condition are 
returned to service via the load sequencer.  
The onsite standby power source for each 4.16 kV ESF bus is a 
dedicated DG.  DGs NE01  and NE02 are dedicated to ESF buses NB01 
and NB02,  respectively.  A DG starts  automatically  on a safety injection 
(SI) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure, steam line pressure or high 
containment pressure signals) or on an ESF bus undervoltage signal 
(refer to LCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG)  Start 
Instrumentation").  After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its 
respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus 
undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an SI 
(continued)
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LCO
The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the 
onsite Class I E Electrical Power System and separate and independent 
DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down 
the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an 
anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated  DBA.  
Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are 
part of the licensing basis for the unit.  
In addition,  one required  LSELS per train must be OPERABLE.  
Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and 
voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while 
connected to the ESF buses.  
One offsite circuit consists of either Safeguards TransformerA or B, which 
is supplied from Switchyard  Bus A or B, and feeds through a breaker to 
ESF transformer XNB01,  which,  in turn, powers the NB01  ESF bus 
through its normal feeder breaker or NB02 ESF bus through its alternate 
feeder breaker, if needed.  Another offsite circuit consists of the Startup 
Transformer, which is normally fed from the Switchyard feeding through 
breaker PA 0201, to ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn, powers 
NB02 ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker and  NB01  through its 
alternate feeder breaker, if needed.  ,t, 
Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and 
voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus 
undervoltage.  This will be accomplished within  12 seconds.  Each DG 
must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed 
loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power 
can be restored to the ESF buses.  These capabilities are required to be 
met from a variety of initial  conditions such as DG in standby with the 
engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions.  
Additional  DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required 
Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an 
ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.
Initiating a DG start upon a detected  undervoltage condition,  tripping of 
the incoming offsite power upon a detected undervoltage or degraded 
voltage condition, shedding of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing 
(continued)
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Voltage regulation equipment consisting of automatic load tap changing ESF 
transformers  and associated capacitor banks maintain the preferred sources in the event of 
changing switchyard voltage.